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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION

The only way for us to ever acquire an understanding of Katrina, then, is to come at it from many
different vantage points-to chip away at it, to probe this detail and then that one, to try this way of
approaching it and then that one, until all those fragments of information and insight begin to
form a picture, like the tens of thousands of tesserae that together make up a mosaic.
Kai Erikson 1
Hurricane Katrina’s one-hundred plus miles per hour winds and torrential rainfall made
landfall the morning of August 29, 2005 on the Louisiana coast. Katrina was one of the most
devastating F5 hurricanes in United States history. The National Hurricane Center claims
Hurricane Katrina was the “deadliest hurricane to strike the United States since the Palm BeachLake Okeechobee hurricane of September 1928.” 2 The Louisiana Department of Death and
Hospitals reports “1,464 deceased victims of Hurricane Katrina from Louisiana.” 3 Many of the
estimated one million survivors still living in the high impact areas of Katrina were forced to
relocate. 4 David Brunsma notes that Katrina “created the largest internal U.S. diaspora of
displaced people as the result of a natural disaster in American history.” 5 Regional cities like
Atlanta, Georgia and Houston, Texas became the temporary homes for many evacuees. Some of
those who relocated have never returned to New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, while others have
seemingly remained committed to rebuilding their homesteads.
Katrina’s consequences, however, extended beyond its direct material effects. The public
discourse was another critical aspect of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. The importance and value
of communication during Hurricane Katrina has emerged as a central theme in the growing body
of related critical scholarship connected to the natural disaster. Some scholars have claimed
Katrina revealed the lack of a communication infrastructure and readiness plan for responding to
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natural disasters. 6 Gina L. Genova, for example, argues that the only way to respond across a
large and potentially anarchic space is to have a communication plan capable of creating and
maintaining order. 7 After she examined the internal and external communication within one
nonprofit organization that served disasters, she concludes, “To operate successfully across such
a vast territory, crossing national boundaries, and interfacing with a variety of organizations and
social structures, agencies such as Direct Relief must develop an effective communication
plan.” 8 Genova’s research demonstrated the need for a well prepared communication plan. The
media criticized the local, state, and national governments for their lack of a communication
readiness. Fred Knight muses that the nation should adopt the Boy Scouts of America motto and
“be prepared.” 9 Frank Durham pointedly criticized the lack of communication between President
Bush and various media press outlets. He claimed that the gap between the President and mass
media poses served as a threat to democracy as an institution. 10
Beyond highlighting the need for an effective communication infrastructure, scholars
have increasingly focused on the central role of the mass media during Hurricane Katrina.
Russell R. Dynes and Havidán Rodríguez argue that, “Katrina was the first hurricane to hit the
United States to the accompaniment of continuous (24/7) television coverage.” 11 By telling
stories that disseminated throughout the American public, journalists covering Katrina actively
influenced how the hurricane was mediated to the world. Twenty-four hour media coverage,
seven days a week made the communication about Hurricane Katrina very important to how the
public understood and reacted to Hurricane Katrina.
Scholars have long understood that the mass media plays an important role in American
politics and culture. Doris Graber points out that the role of distributing information is nothing
new: “Not only are the media the chief source of most Americans’ views of the world, but they
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also provide the fastest way to disperse information throughout the entire society.” 12 Americans
rely on the mainstream mass media to know what is happening in their states, country and around
the world. We read the newspaper in the morning. We check our email, voice messages and
online news at work. We even actively seek out news on our portable electronic devices. Even if
one is not actively seeking the news, Americans are bombarded with news information at home,
in the office and in the salon/barbershop. One even encounters mainstream media news when
walking outside or commuting to work. Individuals turn to mass media information especially in
times of crisis because of its ubiquity and constant updating.
Hurricane Katrina demonstrates the important role the media plays in disseminating news
information throughout society. Mainstream news reporting was the only vehicle for most of
Americans to learn about the pending crisis. In some instances, media outlets, rather than the
government, were responsible for disseminating information on assistance, aid, and awareness.
Thevenot argues that the media are largely responsible for the publics’ knowledge of the events
occurring on the Gulf Coast. 13 The importance of accuracy in reporting consequently cannot be
understated. Dynes and Rodríguez maintain the importance of accuracy, when they argue, “[T]his
portrayal of disasters and their aftermath result in both decision makers and the general public
(those impacted by the disaster agent and not) reaching incorrect conclusions about the event thus
impacting the decision-making process.” 14 The stakes were high for the media because they were
only way that anyone received information about Katrina’s landfall. The effects of Hurricane
Katrina reminded the American public of the significance of the mass media lens when reporting
news information.
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Besides simply serving as a source of news, the mass media provide a contextual
framework for understanding what they cover. 15 The media provide models for public attitude,
behavior and orientation, as Graber notes,
The impact of news stories on political leaders and on the average citizen’s views about
the merits of public policies and the performance of public officials demonstrates how
mass media, in combination with other political factors, can influence, American politics.
News stories take millions of Americans, in all walks of life, to the battlefields of the
world. They give them ringside seats for space shuttle launches or basketball
championships. They provide the nation with shared political experiences, such as
watching presidential inaugurations or congressional investigations, that then undergird
public opinions and unite people to decide when political action is required. Print, audio,
and audiovisual media often serve as attitude and behavior models. 16
The media function as more than a model. The media can drive individuals and whole
populations toward certain beliefs and motivate the very same group against other forms of
action. The choice to display certain images, headlines or labels has consequences for those
already impacted by Hurricane Katrina. Carol Winkler contends that, “The process of labeling is
not neutral. Each use of a term is a choice (whether conscious or unconscious) that emphasizes
certain aspects of what is being described, while de-emphasizing others…By happenstance or by
design, labeling necessarily entails perspective taking.” 17 Despite claims or attempts at
objectivity, media use of labels inevitably, as Winkler demonstrates, involve privileging one
perspective at the expense of another. But labeling is not confined to perspective taking or
emphasis. Power relationships, authority, and social order are at stake in the process of labeling.
Geof Wood argues,
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Thus the validity of labels becomes not a matter of substantive objectivity but of the
ability to use labels effectively in action as designations which define parameters for
thought and behaviour, which render environments stable, and which establish spheres of
competence and areas of responsibility. In this way labelling through these sorts of
designations is part of the process of creating social structure. 18
The mainstream mass media, through the use of labels, participates in the creation of social
order. These rhetorical constructions help render certain ways of thinking and behaving as
acceptable or unacceptable. Mass media communication provided the groundwork for the nation
to talk about and respond to Hurricane Katrina and its consequences.
This study will examine one particular label associated with Katrina coverage: “Third
World.” The mass media repeatedly employed the label “Third World” to communicate the
immediate effects of Hurricane Katrina. Kristin Gazlay, the Associated Press Deputy Managing
Editor for National News, refers to the aftermath of Katrina as “Third World devastation in a
First World country.” 19 The Times Picayune, a regional paper, reports that “Americans watched
Third World scenes play out in a beloved American city.” 20 Evoking the imagery and memory of
the Third World was a constant theme used to report the various effects and consequences of
Hurricane Katrina. Dr. Dwayne A. Thomas, chief executive officer for two of the hospitals in
New Orleans, witnessed dead bodies, rising water and overflowing sewage. He describes his first
hand experience as being “as close as I've gotten to the third world.” 21 Given the prevalence of
the “Third World” label in the media’s coverage of Katrina to describe what many considered the
First World, this study will examine the uses, motives and implications for employing the label.
The need for close examination of the media’s use of the “Third World” label is multifaceted. Peter Worsley argues that because Third World is “used in so many different ways that
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we no longer assume that we all know what is meant.” 22 The label has been used to demarcate
nation-state alliances along ideological, geo-political and economic lines and for both domination
and resistance. 23 Heloise Weber claims that “the political utility of the Third World can be seen
to have had a disciplinary function in that it legitimated inequality within through stories about
the external Other.” 24 Throughout the media coverage of Hurricane Katrina, the “Third World”
label evoked certain values, judgments and beliefs.
The mass media’s use of the label “Third World” suggests provocative questions about
rhetoric and identity. Labeling the region Third World conveyed more than just the devastation
wrought; it rhetorically lifts the Gulf Coast right out of the United States. The U.S. is typically
not referred to as a Third World country. Instead, it historically belongs to a group of nations of
the so-called First World. Third World is associated with poverty, chaos and in need of
development; it is generally aligned with “Africa, Asia and the southern Americas.” 25 Referring
to part of the typically First World United States as a Third World country reveals paradoxical
tensions. For example, Cynthia Young highlights the danger “that conflating people in the First
World with those in the Third World borrows the latter’s legitimacy while maintaining the
spotlight firmly on the First World.” 26 Exploring the potential for empathy and resistance in
identifying with the Third World is just one avenue for thinking about the tensions between
labeling part of a so-called First World the Third World.
To better understand how the media utilized the “Third World” label, the remainder of
this chapter will explore current understandings of the rhetorical context surrounding Katrina
coverage. Afterwards, it will justify the use of a rhetorical analysis, cluster analysis in particular,
to further explore how the media employed the “Third World” label. Finally, this chapter will

7
outline how the study’s analysis is organized into chapters related to the impacted inhabitants, the
governments involved and the spaces affected by Katrina.
Katrina and the Labeling Process
Some scholars have focused on how images have constructed the events throughout the
landfall and aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The images of America’s poor and black played a
dominant role in the coverage of Hurricane Katrina’s consequences. Faux and Kim draw
attention to the visual images, arguing that visual images uniquely “have multilayered
meanings.” 27 After examining the photographs used in the New York Times, Faux and Kim
revealed the production of racial images for mass consumption. Hillary Potter argues that “the
concerns of racial identity, race relations and racial implications related to the storm were heavily
influenced by the images fed to the general public of the ravage of New Orleans and its
immediate surrounding areas.” 28 The images and labels utilized by the mass media shaped how
the American public interpreted and responded to Hurricane Katrina’s effects.
The people of New Orleans attracted most of the coverage because of the severity of their
situation, New Orleans’ geographical importance and America’s familiarity with the city. New
Orleans is a major city of the Gulf Coast with rich culture, history and tradition. AfricanAmerican and especially poor African-American citizens felt the brunt of Katrina’s deadly
consequences. A majority of the Louisiana deaths took place in New Orleans. New Orleans
before Hurricane Katrina “was a city of almost 500,000 people, two-thirds of whom were
African-American (black).” 29 Over 140,000 people in New Orleans were living in poverty and
“84 percent were black.” 30 Ashley Doane went as far to say that Hurricane Katrina “was perhaps
the most concentrated assault on color-blindness since the 1992 Rodney King verdict and the Los
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Angeles riots.” 31 Images on television and in the newspapers portrayed a mostly black population
stranded and in desperate need of help.
Some scholars have focused on stereotypes of African-Americans and crime when
depicting the effects of Katrina. Kevin Cullen argues that the media used biased and
exaggerated descriptions in their coverage. He says that “Katrina unveiled the news
media’s bias against poor people, especially poor black people.” 32 Two photos in
particular became emblematic of the racial tone that characterized media coverage of
Hurricane Katrina: In each photo people were shown with bags and soda; the one of a
black person referred to “looting” and the one of a white person referred to “finding”
bread and soda (Dyson, 2006, p. 164). Those who were “looting” and were labeled as
“thugs were black, and those, like the doctors who were said to have “commandeered”
drugs, were white. 33
With such racial bias present in mainstream media coverage, the emergence of an overwhelming
negative reaction should have been no surprise. Hip hop artist and activist Kanye West was
quoted saying “George Bush doesn’t care about black people.” 34 West’s criticism reflected the
belief that the racial demographics of the Gulf Coast deterred a quick and efficient government
response.
Other scholars argue that a delayed governmental response resulted from media
characterizations of a chaotic Gulf Coast. Stillman and Villmoare claim that describing New
Orleans and other places as torn apart by anarchy and violence changed the type of response they
received. While some thought that survivors should have been greeted with aid and sympathy,
Stillman and Villmoare explain that Americans faced armed soldiers patrolling the streets of
New Orleans:
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This frame of reference and the law-and-order rhetoric associated with it played out the
myth that individuals are to be held fully accountable for their actions and that African
Americans and whites are to be held accountable in different ways. Looters were to be
policed and incarcerated because the first priority of government was seen as order; one
of the first governmental institutions re-established after the storm was a temporary jail at
the bus station. 35
The rhetorical process identified here is important. A label named an individual (guilty or not) as
a looter, pre-determined the looter as associated with crime and chaos and, in this instance,
resulted in a violent military/police style response to what might have otherwise been understood
as a humanitarian situation. While the exact nature of the looter label’s communicative
consequences needs further study, the media descriptions may have contributed toward the
additional real consequences of Hurricane Katrina.
The refugee label was one label in the media coverage of Katrina that did receive
tremendous attention. As soon as September 3, less than a week after Katrina’s initial landfall,
newspapers started picking-up reaction over the labeling of Katrina’s survivors as refugees.
Frederick L. Daniels Jr., a concerned member of the public, was quoted in a Don O’Briant piece
in the Atlanta Journal Constitution. O’Briant reports,
Your use of the term 'refugee' is incorrect and is a direct insult to the people who have
suffered through the worst disaster in this nation's history," said Frederick L. Daniels Jr.,
a senior vice president for Citizens Trust Bank. "Is it the fact that most of those evacuated
from New Orleans and the Gulf region are people of color who are poor, disfranchised
and represent a Third World country quality of life that contributes to the flippant
attitude regarding the use of 'refugee'?... A better word would be 'evacuee.' 36
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Daniel’s response to the Atlanta Journal Constitution made evident that the use of refugee may
be offensive to the mostly American survivors. His commentary suggested that the label
“refugee” had real implications for the people who suffered. This common objection was often
accompanied by a discussion of race and class bigotry because, as many observers noted, the
refugee label was only used because the majority of survivors were poor and black. 37
Critical commentary on race and class existed but questions continued about the quality
and productiveness of this discussion. Ashley Doane goes as far as to say that, “while the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina may have seemed to set a new direction for racial dialogue, what
transpired is ultimately best understood within the “same old tune” of existing racial
ideologies.” 38 Doane argues that while race is acknowledged to exist in mainstream society, race
is portrayed as not mattering for most of America. Color-blindness, according to Doane, is the
prevailing race(ist) ideology. 39 The discussion after Katrina, for Doane, was largely an attempt to
demonstrate how race was not an issue in the response to or coverage of Hurricane Katrina.
Perhaps what is needed, she argues, is another vantage point from which to interpret and
understand the effects of Katrina. A different perspective on the conversations following
Hurricane Katrina could help advance the current discussion on race, class and communication.
Analyzing the use and implications of the label “Third World” surrounding Hurricane
Katrina can extend the discussions of race and class after Katrina. Young argues that, “the very
use of the term Third World brings with it (among other things) a history shaped by racism,
imperialism, colonialism, and a ruthless capital-accumulation drive that depends on a self/other
logic ultimately about the self rather than the other.” 40 While Daniels understood that the refugee
label was about race, class and a quality of life, examining the label “Third World” helps paint a
larger picture of inequality and asymmetrical power relationships. Arturo Escobar claims, “the
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Third World is the realm par excellence of all forms of power in today’s world (from the most
brutal forms of torture to sophisticated power techniques).” 41 The consequences of Hurricane
Katrina are not just about a history of race or class bigotry in the United States. Rethinking the
race and class talking points after Katrina around the label “Third World” revealed an ideology
that rhetorically divides, symbolically unites and privileges certain realities over others.
A Different Approach
Roger Smitter, National Communication Association Executive Director, offered the
Communication discipline as a necessary corrective to help understand the events of Hurricane
Katrina. For Smitter, “human communication isn’t just a detail in a story, it IS the story.” 42 And
with such a pronouncement, Smitter offers five questions to suggest what the communication
discipline can contribute to post-hurricane Katrina coverage:
Why were evacuation messages ineffective in moving some Gulf coast residents to flee
the storm? How is it that organizations devoted to providing rescue and aid in disasters
can be become dysfunctional in their collaboration? What rhetorical strategies enabled
some speakers to emerge as leaders in the crisis? What long-term impact will the
televised images of Katrina’s impact have on the public trust in government? What forms
of technology (regardless of their technical efficiency) are best suited to deliver the
messages needed in a crisis? 43
Although Smitter’s questions hint at some directions for communication studies, he does not
specify methodologies for scholars to engage the discourse circulating through Katrina’s landfall.
Extending Smitter’s emphasis on communication, Marcia Alesan Dawkins understood
and engaged the importance of a rhetorical perspective in her article “A Rhetorical Response to
Hurricane Katrina.” 44 She began by invoking Kenneth Burke. She says “When I read that ‘the
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description of a terrific storm is Symbolically charged’ I felt a shock, as through Kenneth Burke
(1968) had been reading the newspaper over my shoulder (p. 165).” 45 Dawkins’ shock was
inspired by the representations, rhetoric, and symbols used to describe and interpret Hurricane
Katrina’s devastating path across the Southeastern United States. She concludes “these symbols
point to existent patterns behind chaotic scenes.” 46 For Dawkins, rhetorical analysis was able to
investigate and interrogate the relationships between symbols and the symbolic environments
they gesture towards. Because “symbols are tools of social construction and reconstruction,”
rhetorical theory and criticism were indispensable tools for gaining insights into the tensions and
contradictions defining Hurricane Katrina’s wake. 47
Dawkins understanding of rhetoric explains the significance of why the “Third World”
label must be confronted from within a rhetorical perspective. She says,
Rhetorical theory allows us to go about an exploration of the dialectical tensions that arise
among conflicting rhetors and audiences as they argue from their own linguistic and
symbolic systems. It can reveal the very real costs of resisting or identifying with
competing notions of universality and community as they are used to argue for humanity.
We can learn to reconsider the effects of submerged particularities within unifying terms
which have been historically deployed in national and international rhetorics of
reconstruction. 48
Rhetorical inquiry is uniquely suited to analyze the communicative practices used while reporting
on and about Katrina. Rhetoric’s attention to how language and images can constitute or
influence an individual (or collective) response is crucial to understanding the significance of the
events after Katrina’s landfall. A rhetorical perspective of the media’s use of the “Third World”
label enables a better understanding of the tensions arising from the effects of Hurricane Katrina
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and the real consequences of identifying with certain understandings of belonging. Given the
larger context of chaos and uncertainty surrounding Hurricane Katrina, rhetorical analysis can
best examine the label “Third World” because rhetorical perspectives study “the strategic use of
communication to achieve effects under conditions of uncertainty. Its focus is on how people
influence one another through the use of symbols and it offers accounts of knowledge and action
amidst contingent conditions.” 49 A rhetorical analysis of the “Third World” label would help to
gain a different perspective on the events of Hurricane Katrina, provide an example of the
methods and analysis that rhetoric offers the post-Katrina discussion and shed some light on how
we can better prepare for and respond to future crisis events.
Method
This study examines the rhetoric embedded throughout the mass media coverage of
Hurricane Katrina. I selected newspapers as the primary medium to represent the media
coverage. Images associated with Hurricane Katrina have already been examined to some extent
within the literature. I chose newspapers for textual analysis because words and text evoke
responses similar to that of images while maintaining a fidelity to the intellectual history and use
of the “Third World” label. I analyze fifty newspapers to determine how Hurricane Katrina was
interpreted, relayed and articulated. The newspapers are a mixture of local, regional, national and
international papers accessible via the electronic database Lexis-Nexis. I chose these because,
according to Lexis-Nexis, the “United States newspapers must be listed in the top 50 circulation
in Editor & Publisher Year Book. Newspapers published outside the United States must be in
English language and listed as a national newspaper in Benn's World Media Directory or one of
the top 5% in circulation for the country. 50 They range from The New York Times, USA Today
and Atlanta Journal Constitution to The Daily Telegraph, The Toronto Star, and News Strait
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Times (Malaysia). This sample provides a broad basis of the public dialogue happening about
Hurricane Katrina. Within that database of newspapers, I searched for and selected all articles,
letters, and editorials which contained the phrases “Hurricane Katrina” and “Third World.”
I analyze the articles ranging from the days of Katrina’s landfall on August 25, 2005
through January 3, 2006. I focus on the dates immediately following Hurricane Katrina because I
want to capture how the mainstream mass media was communicating when the American
public’s desires, energies and passions were peaked. 51 I stopped just after the New Year because
there was renewed interest surrounding the holiday season. The New Year was a chance for
newspapers to recount the year’s biggest stories and make predictions for the coming year. This
New Year coverage was an early marker of how Hurricane Katrina would be historically
remembered.
I use Kenneth Burke’s cluster analysis to analyze the 373 articles that met the selection
criteria. Burke’s cluster analysis is one of many methodological tools located within his
substantial body of work in language theory. This particular method of Burke’s “offers an
objective way of determining relationships between a speaker’s main concerns, as well as a new
perspective to rhetorical critics who desire to discover more about the motives and characters of
speakers.” 52 Burke describes how his approach to clusters accesses the often unconscious
motives of an individual:
Now, the work of every writer contains a set of implicit equations. He uses “associational
clusters.” And you may, by examining his work, find “what goes with what” in these
clusters – what kinds of acts and images and personalities and situations go with his
notions of heroism, villainy, consolation, despair, etc. And though he be perfectly
conscious of the act of writing, conscious of selecting a certain kind of imagery to
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reinforce a certain kind of mood, etc., he cannot possibly be conscious of the
interrelationships among all these equations. Afterwards, by inspecting his work
“statistically,” we or he may disclose by objective citation the structure of motivation
operating here. There is no need to “supply” motives. The interrelationships themselves
are his motives. For they are his situation; and situation is but another word for motives.
The motivation out of which he writes is synonymous with the structural way in which he
puts events and values together when he writes; and however consciously he may go
about such work, there is a kind of generalization about these interrelations that he could
not have been conscious of, since the generalization could be made by the kind of
inspection that is possibly only after the completion of the work.” 53 [sic]
For Burke, clusters unconsciously map the values that motivate or drive a speaker to associate
one image or word with another. The clusters may consist of words, symbols, labels or other
rhetorical devices. A critic may piece the individual images together in clusters to reveal a
motivating or ideological force. I will identify the words, phrases and associations that
accompany the “Third World” label throughout the media coverage. I will analyze a narrow
context surrounding the “Third World,” taking into consideration immediately adjacent context
but setting aside the larger place the label plays in the individual article. Focusing on the more
narrow context moves the emphasis away from the motives of an individual author or rhetor to
potential socio-symbolic motivations throughout multiple texts.
Although many rhetorical scholars have followed Burke in analyzing motivations and
associations in an individual speakers’ single text, cluster analysis is also applicable to analyses
that involve multiple texts. 54 Motives and associations can still exist even if not contained within
one single text. If there is a phenomenon or ideology that extends beyond the individual, it would
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be necessary to examine associations and relationships outside of the individual in a larger
context. For example, Heinz and Lee employ a methodological approach similar to this study’s
cluster analysis. They draw from a large sample of government, industry, and public texts related
to meat consumption. They narrow these texts according to their symbolic richness. They
acknowledge that “Although our selection process cannot justify broadly generalizable claims,
we have gathered texts which reflect at least part of the contemporary reality of meat
consumption.” 55 Heinz and Lee’s study demonstrates the ability to broaden the scope of a
rhetorical text for cluster analysis from an individual’s speech to a larger reconstructed and
fragmentary text.
Cluster analysis is useful in exploring what contribution rhetorical theory can make to the
conversation about Hurricane Katrina. Analyzing clusters of terms is uniquely suited to
investigating tension, motive and identification in the post-Katrina rhetoric. While Burke does
not outline a specific method for cluster analysis, many in the field of Communication Studies
contend that one needs to identify the key terms, determine the clustered relationships around the
key terms and finally perform an agon analysis with the key terms. 56 Cluster analysis operates by
figuring out what the dominant terms are, what terms go with what and which terms oppose
what. Thomas Enos explains how such a process contributes to understanding:
But there is an added dimension to what we usually think of as rhetorical analysis in that
all elements are interconnected by the key word in Burke’s system, identification, where
the ritualistic hierarchy he calls ‘tragic rhythm of action’ ends in some kind of
identification. Reconstructing means searching for identifiable cues to the writer’s
motives. In the process of identifying a variety of clusters by reconstructing’ them, the
reader achieves textual identification. 57
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By identifying clusters of terms one may be able to identify the motives driving the particular
clusters or texts constituted by the clusters. Heinz and Lee argue that “By uncovering
associational clusters, critics can reveal the predominance of certain cultural values. Values
indicate a society’s understanding of particular objects or sentiments as desirable or necessary.” 58
This study, through cluster analysis, can map out the symbolic realities created and constructed in
the articulation of Third World.
I will divide the key terms and clusters in this analysis into three theme related categories.
The first group of relational clusters is used to represent the place, space or scene of New Orleans
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The second group of relational clusters is meant to
represent descriptions of how the local, state and federal government responded to the events of
Hurricane Katrina. The last and final group of clusters concerns those used to describe the people
of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast.
Chapter Outline
Chapter two will identify and arrange the cluster associations used to describe the place of
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast before and after Hurricane Katrina. These clusters will be
analyzed in the context of how Third World places are described. I rely upon the threads from the
development literature that emphasize space and place to provide a framework for analyzing
these clusters. This analysis will ask what are the motivations and implications for employing the
“Third World” label to describe a place within a typically identified First World country?
Chapter three will identify and organize the clusters according to the descriptions of the
local, state and federal government actors during Hurricane Katrina. These clusters are placed
aside how Third World governments are described and characterized to examine potential
motives for labeling a government Third World. I will draw upon a variety of disciplines within
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the development literature to understand these institutional clusters. This chapter will analyze the
motivations and implications for using the label to describe government institutions.
Chapter four will identify and cluster the descriptions of the inhabitants of New Orleans
and the Gulf Coast as Hurricane Katrina made landfall. This cluster analysis will examine the
relationships of the clusters around the people of New Orleans to those characteristics which
define Third World populations. I use the development literature base to provide a context for
interpreting the clusters of Third World peoples. This chapter will focus on what a Third World
identity means and how it functions in the context of Katrina.
Chapter five will offer concluding and reflective comments on this rhetorical cluster
analysis. I will summarize the general conclusions drawn from labeling the place, government
institutions and people of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast as Third World in the media coverage
of Hurricane Katrina. I will also describe possible contributions this analysis makes to
understanding Hurricane Katrina from a communication perspective and to the Communication
discipline. This study will conclude with its own limitations and recommendations for future
research.
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CHAPTER 2.
HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE PLACE OF THE THIRD WORLD
In hardly any field of study are words straightforward technical terms capable of uncomplicated,
unambiguous definitions. This fact is particularly true of the study of the Third World, both
because it is a relatively new field of study and because it is a field into which numerous
ideological, political and social conflicts enter. The vocabulary of Third World studies is
therefore more liable than most to be imbued with problems. Words may express a particular
experience or attitude or cultural norm or viewpoint; or they may involve a prejudgment of the
questions to which they correspond.
Kofi Buenor Hadjor 59
Even though the label “Third World” has a short history, its meaning is not without
ambiguity and richness. The various interpretative meanings of the “Third World” label emerge,
in part, because of the changing scenes in which rhetors deploy the label. In some iterations, the
“Third World” label describes geographic places like internationally recognized nation-states. 60 It
also refers to a subjectivity or one’s lived place in the world. 61 Third World can function to
identify belonging to a community, whether from the viewpoint of those in power or those
considered outside power. 62 Some associate the Third World with backward, uncivilized and
desperate countries, 63 while others see the Third World as a site for reclaiming resistance,
strength and community. 64 The different meanings associated with Third World allow the
phrase’s flexible adaptation to material circumstances that appear to conflict.
In this chapter I will utilize cluster analysis to understand the use of the “Third World”
label to describe New Orleans and the rest of the Gulf Coast. First, I will trace both the origins of
the label and provide a brief history highlighting key movements in its meaning. Awareness of
the circumstances that gave rise to shifts in the “Third World” label’s meaning enable a keener
insight into the uses of the Third World today. Second, I will identify and analyze the clusters
themselves. In analyzing the relationships surrounding the use of Third World, I will discuss the
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larger symbolic web of values that these Third World clusters weave. Finally, I will make
concluding remarks about the significance and implications of the relationship between place, the
“Third World” label and New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina as described in media
portrayals surrounding the crisis.
An Introduction to the Third World
Alfred Sauvy is often cited as the person who first used the label “Third World.” 65 B.C.
Smith claims, “There has been a lot of discussion as to who used the term first, but it is generally
accepted that it was the French demographer and economic historian, Alfred Sauvy, who coined
the phrase in the early 1950s.” 66 Wolf-Smith maintains, “The original analogy used by Sauvy
was to the Tiers État and, as both Lacoste and Love point out, he was alluding to the 1789
oratory of the Abbé Sieyès-‘What is the Third Estate? Everything. What has it been till now in
the political order? Nothing. What does it want to be? Something.’” 67 Even though the Third
World emerges from the context of the French Revolution, “there is also the view that it should
have been translated as ‘Third Force’ because Sauvy seems to have in mind the problem of
power blocs during the Cold War.” 68 Here, Smith foreshadows the geo-politics of the Cold War
as one of the motivating factors and places where the meaning of the Third World takes shape.
Like most phrases, the origin of the label “Third World” is not without debate. Peter
Worsley argues Sauvy should not be credited for the first utterance of the Third World. 69 Instead,
Worsley suggests Claude Bourdet deserves acknowledgement for using Third World to refer to
the “French political left.” 70 Despite disagreement about who is credited with first publishing the
term “Third World,” Wolf-Phillips admits, “Worsley and I are in agreement when he says: ‘What
the Third World originally was, then, is clear; it was the non-aligned world.’” 71 The initial
meaning of the Third World then involved a group de facto excluded from the traditional
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political order. In short, the First World was generally aligned with the United States of America
and capitalism. The Second World was aligned with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
communism. Those countries or parties remaining and not aligned with either communism or
capitalism constituted the Third World.
While no one may be able to precisely pinpoint the event(s) triggering a shift in the
meaning of the “Third World” label, a number of socio-economic and political factors
contributed to the change in focus from political non-alignment to an economic determination.
First, and in no particular order, Jean Robert argues that President Harry Truman’s 1949
inaugural address helped usher in an era of economically developing the Third World:
After World War II, Mexico and the rest of the “Third World” were invaded by the idea
of development. According to President Harry Truman – whose inaugural address in 1949
did much to popularize the term – development consists in helping “free peoples of the
world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for
housing and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.” 72
For President Truman, the United States was uniquely placed to “embark on a bold new program
for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.” 73 President Truman’s stated motivations for
his program of development was not just to highlight and extend America’s progress and
hegemony. President Truman also spoke about the plight of those in the underdeveloped world.
Demonstrating his awareness of the deplorable condition in the Third World, he claimed,
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their
food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and

22
stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous
areas. 74
Truman’s inaugural address set into motion a program of development whose target was the
underdeveloped or Third World. He conceived the people living in the Third World as an
economic threat to themselves and others around the globe. Truman’s development declaration
helped move the world’s understanding of the Third World from political non-alignment to
economic deficiency.
President Truman’s altruistic motives for labeling the underdeveloped or Third World
were not the only impetus for the evolution of the label’s meaning. Robert’s earlier description
portrays Truman’s development approach to the rest of the world as a style of invasion. 75 While
the United States was not using exclusively military means to invade the so-called
underdeveloped peoples across the world, President Truman’s era of development sought to
bring advancement and order through economic, cultural and other means. Truman’s desires
seemed benign but they were also “providing the motivation and legitimization for transforming
other societies in their image.” 76 In advancing an agenda of development, the United States
appeared to be attempting to re-create the American experiment in other nations.
In part, these American programs of development were aimed at creating order out of
perceived chaos. The countries associated with the underdeveloped and Third World were
countries not aligned with United States capitalism or Soviet communism. These countries
shared economic systems and a standard of living that were insufficient from the relative
perspective of the First and Second Worlds. As a result of the exclusion by the First and Second
World, “poverty continues to be a real and significant feature of Third World countries.” 77 Smith
expands on the implications of the economic force, claiming that, “In symbiotic relationship with
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such poverty are low levels of productive capacity, low life expectancy, high infant mortality,
illiteracy, the oppression of women, and grossly unequal distributions of wealth.” 78 The lack of
support and investment from the First and Second World arguably bred the chaotic conditions
within the Third World.
Eliminating and transforming poverty-associated characteristics were the motivating
forces driving President Truman’s development plan for the Third World. Cowen and Shenton
agree that, “development was meant to construct order out of social disorders of rapid urban
migration, poverty and unemployment.” 79 President Truman’s inaugural address signaled a shift
in the meaning of the Third World. Tucker best describes the process intrinsic to this shift as an
imperial process, where he states,
The development discourse is part of an imperial process whereby other peoples are
appropriated and turned into objects. It is an essential part of the process whereby the
“developed” countries manage, control and even create the Third World economically,
politically, sociologically and culturally. 80
While initially the Third World was an active subject resisting the exclusion by the First and
Second World, Truman’s underdeveloped Third World became a poor and disorderly object to
which the First World delivered progress, advancement and development.
A second contributing factor to the shift in the meaning of the “Third World” label was
the ever changing contours of twentieth century geo-politics. As World Wars I and II helped
shape the meaning of the Third World through transformations in colonialist geo-politics, the
politics of the Cold War were also an important contributor. Randall argues,
…[B]y the middle of the sixties, the cold war had become a routine and the tensions
generated by it were slackening in intensity. The economic and development issues were
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becoming prominent, reducing the monopoly of security and strategic issues in world
politics. That marked the beginning of the Third World concept being viewed in its
economic context and thrust. 81
Over time, political presence in the Third World increasingly became necessary for
counterbalancing the other superpower because of the decreasing importance of Cold War
security issues. Despite the changing influence of the Cold War, however, the Third World was
not irrelevant. Escobar claims, “The notions of ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘Third World’ emerged
as working concepts in the process by which the West (and the East) redefined themselves and
the global power structures.” 82 Now as the Cold War mentality was institutionalized, countries
began utilizing the Third World to define and secure their own self-identity. While the United
States had previously relied on the Cold War relationship to define America and our policies,
First and Second World countries increasingly relied on comparisons against the poor and
chaotic Third World to strengthen their own images as wealthy and stable. Wolf-Phillips argues
that with Cold War politics, the Third World “becomes more strongly associated with ‘neglect,
exploitation and revolutionary potential’ than ‘non-alignment’.” 83 Whereas the Third World
countries originally shared their exclusion from politics as a common characteristic, the meaning
of the “Third World” label changed to reflect the characteristics common to the countries
because they had been excluded.
The concept of the “Third World” was also defined by its Southern geography. The
divisions and alliances influenced by Cold War politics manifested cartographically along the
North-South axis. Julian Eckl and Ralph Weber suggest David Horowitz’s 1966 Hemispheres
North & South: Economic Disparity Among Nations was among the first book length studies
dedicated to a world divided by an industrialized North and an agricultural South. 84 While the
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First and Second Worlds in the North produced economic excess through industrialization, the
Third World in the South survived through its agriculture. Dwayne Woods claims the
predominance of agricultural in the South was because of the characteristics unique to Southern
geography; Woods cites the “natural resources, the effects of climate, tropical diseases,
transportation costs and the diffusion of technologies across spatial barriers within and between
nations [as] the main determinants in the gap between rich and poor regions.” 85 The difference in
economic foundations, industrial on the Northern side and agricultural on the Southern, helped
create and magnify the divisions between the First, Second and Third World. The North (or First
and Second Worlds) justified interventionist expeditions to the South (Third World) by claiming
to bridge the development and industrial gap. 86 The geographically Southern characteristics
helped drive the economically-based meaning of the Third World.
The meaning of the Third World also changed for those most impacted by the new
economically-driven development policies. The economic implications of the “Third World”
label were not limited to those with money, power or resources. The lived experience of those
feeling the brunt of colonialism and development, Hadjor argues, led to “the emergence of a
growing consciousness among the peoples of different Third World countries themselves that
they shared significant common problems and experiences in relation to other countries.” 87 More
than just a shared consciousness occurred; the Third World also began to stand in for a
community of affected peoples against something. Previously, the Third World represented the
non-aligned populations of the world, but after the shift, as Smith argues, “the Third World stood
for solidarity against the continuing intervention and involvement of the powerful economies in
the developing economies and polities of the world.” 88 With this sentiment of intentional
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resistance, the meaning of Third World returned to Alfred Sauvy’s original interpretation of
Third World or Third Force.
Finally, a third contributing factor to the economic aspects of the term’s meaning was the
increasing globalized and interconnected world. The practices of globalization, an increase in
non-governmental and international governing organizations, and technological developments in
communication have substantially reduced the distance between the global and the local. 89
Whereas nation-states traditionally constituted the Third World, the contemporary landscape of
the Third World in an era of globalization is more indicative of attitudes, values and
characteristics. Weber reasons,
…[T]o use the concept of the Third World (or Third World states) as an analytical
category, which in its classical form relied on the territorial-sovereignty-authority link, is,
it would seem, to continue to invoke a way of thinking that no longer offers a meaningful
reference point for contemporary global politics. 90
While not condemning the territorially based concept, Randall agrees by maintaining,
“[I]ncreasingly the Third World or the South, is becoming a world-wide social category rather
than a geographically defined one, this is only a trend; it is not a completed process.” 91 The social
and cultural aspect of the original conception of the “Third World” label had, and continues to
have, implications for the revolutionary or non-aligned Third World. The process, while
incomplete, is contrary to what Tucker calls the myth of development, which “is elevated to the
status of natural law, objective reality and evolutionary necessity.” 92 De-linking the Third World
from the territory of the nation-state enables the characteristics traditionally associated with the
Third World to traverse borders and boundaries. Populations not traditionally aligned as a Third
World country could claim revolutionary potential as a non-aligned or excluded group.
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An aterritorial or deterritorialized Third World enabled different ways of aligning
community. Cynthia Young claims, “the use of the term Third World offered a way of
interpellating and signaling a community with certain shared interests.” 93 Young’s Third World
shares a resistance to the very developmental and colonial policies that helped create and shape
the Third World. But for her, the Third World does not just extend beyond North-South or
continents but traditional First World-Third World binaries. Her empirical work concerns the
extant Third World communities within the First World, specifically the United States. She
points out that, “The use of the term Third World by U.S. Third World Leftists described a dense
ideological and political nexus as much as it did a particular geographic region or economic stage
of development.” 94 Young’s analysis of Third World Leftists demonstrates the ways in which the
“Third World” label has transformed. While still gesturing towards Sauvy’s original nonalignment meaning, some Third World Leftists embrace the ambiguous meanings possible under
the Third World rhetoric.
This brief survey of the origins and use of the label “Third World” confirms Hadjor’s
assessment of the Third World as imbued with ambiguity, contradiction and conflict. The phrase
“Third World” has traversed geopolitical, political, economic and geographic boundaries. It has
been deployed, appropriated and re-appropriated. It has been symbolically charged to convey
backwardness, incivility and passivity while also connoting freedom, resistance and
revolutionary agency. It has been used to convey both negative judgments and positive attitudes.
Humanitarian intervention, genocidal comparisons and near-genocidal atrocities have all been
carried out in the name of the “Third World.” Comprehending the brief and battled history of the
phrase “Third World” will serve as a contextual backdrop to help better understand the
mainstream mass media’s use of the phrase in the context of Hurricane Katrina.
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The Third World as Place in Katrina Coverage
In analyzing the media references to the “Third World” label, this study divides the
sample into two different groupings. The first set of Third World clusters describes New Orleans
and the Gulf Coast before the arrival of Hurricane Katrina. Even though the clusters are taken
from the mass media coverage following Katrina’s landfall, these clusters refer back to and
construct an understanding of pre-Katrina New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. The second grouping
of clusters represents the media coverage of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast after Katrina made
landfall. By separating the Third World cluster groupings; this study yields insight into how
Katrina altered the applications of the “Third World” label in the United States context.
New Orleans As Characterized Before Hurricane Katrina
The clusters describing pre-Katrina New Orleans and the Gulf Coast were multi-vocal in
nature. Not only were different media sources used to constitute the mainstream mass media
sample but a variety of eye-witnesses, survivors, journalists, volunteers and others were all
quoted in the media coverage. I established a sample of 373 articles as described in Chapter
One’s methodology section. I have narrowed these articles by eliminating stories repeatedly
picked up on the news wire, stories that really just had the words “Third World” and “Hurricane
Katrina” and the stories that were not actually a story about Hurricane Katrina but a summary of
the news for the day. For example, they might have had one story on Katrina and a different story
referencing the Third World. I finished with a reduced sample of 94 stories that offer a rich and
diverse foundation for this cluster analysis. Three themes emerged from within these 94 articles.
First, New Orleans was portrayed as an exemplar of American development, hegemony and
status. Second, the same area was represented as a place of Third World politics, culture and life.
Finally, while both characterizations were prevalent in media discourse, a certain relationship is
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implied between the appearance of order on the surface and the reality of disorder lying deep in
the roots of the South.
First, New Orleans was described in twelve articles as embodying the traits of a First
World city in a First World nation. Three times New Orleans was labeled a major city. An
editorial in The Baltimore Sun referred to New Orleans as “A major city, among America's most
distinctive places.” 95 Here, New Orleans qualifying as major because of its status as a defining
American icon, along the lines of Las Vegas, New York City, Chicago and Los Angeles. New
Orleans is distinct because of its internationally-renowned Mardi Gras celebrations. The Sun
editorial anticipated the costs and enormous efforts of reconstructing New Orleans’ claim as a
major city. Sherry M. Leventhal, writing a letter to The Boston Globe, called New Orleans a
“major city” in the context of her discussion of the size of the necessary evacuations and troop
levels. 96 Finally, Robert E. Pierre and Paul Farhi, staff writers for The Washington Post,
described New Orleans as a “major city” in commenting on the controversy surrounding use of
the refugee label to describe New Orleans residents. 97 Here, the city emerged as major due to the
thousands of people directly affected by Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. The size of the city,
number of people affected and symbolic meaning all contributed to the conclusion that New
Orleans was a major American city.
In the pre-Katrina description, New Orleans was also defined as a progressive place.
Army First Sergeant Maurice A. Thomas characterized New Orleans in The Boston Globe as a
“progressive city.” 98 By itself, the word “progressive” implies advancement - ideological,
political, economical or structural. One may consider New Orleans progressive because of
development, buildings or infrastructure. Or New Orleans can be progressive because of its’
perceived loose regulations (and morality) concerning drinking, drugs and sexuality. In Thomas’
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context, progress implies advancement. He says, “New Orleans went from a progressive city to a
Third World country in a matter of hours.” 99 New Orleans, with its infrastructure for electricity,
water and plumbing, compared favorably with the characteristics common to the First World
throughout the history of development.
New Orleans, before Hurricane Katrina, was not just a major or progressive city; the
media also labeled New Orleans a distinctively “American” city. Ten different articles referred to
New Orleans before Katrina’s devastation as a distinctly American city. Bill Walsh of The
Times-Picayune (New Orleans) relayed watching “Third World scenes play out in a beloved
American city.” 100 Rosa Brooks, a Los Angeles Times columnist cited in The Washington Post,
called New Orleans a “major American city.” While the fact that any city physically located
within the United States is identified as “American” seems obvious, Brooks’ identification is also
important. For example, the adjective accompanying “American city” is “beloved.” If a city is not
considered “American,” the city may not garner the same attention and recognition by the
American public. New Orleans was treasured in part because it was identified as American.
Second, even though New Orleans was described as a major American city pre-Katrina,
the media also characterized it as resembling a poor and soiled Third World place. In covering
Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath along the Gulf Coast and New Orleans, fourteen news articles
explicitly mentioned pre-Katrina New Orleans’ Third World levels of entrenched poverty.
Michael Stanton, who used to live in New Orleans and now, resides in Beirut, Lebanon, stated in
the The Baltimore Sun, “The effect of this hurricane on New Orleans is equal to the effect on a
city in the Third World, because that's what this is - extremely poor and extremely depressed and
extremely fragile.” 101 Stanton’s commentary portrayed New Orleans before Katrina, not as a
proud American city, but a poor, weak and fragile city. Importantly, the fragility was not
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something that just had happened but occurred over the course of time. Stanton referenced the
“underlying social conditions” as the structural reasons why New Orleans already resembled a
Third World place. 102
The effects of Hurricane Katrina revealed the long-term consequences of structurally
caused poverty as a hidden reality. Clarence Page, a columnist for the Chicago Tribune, said
“Katrina suddenly made America's invisible poor very visible.” 103 Hurricane Katrina, Page
argues, was able to transform a population already considered poor into a visible front-page news
story. Importantly, the damage wrought by Katrina did not transform a wealthy or even middleclass area into a poor Third World. The argument advanced in these clusters is that Hurricane
Katrina merely shed light on an already present situation, one that had not been considered
mainstream news worthy.
Critics frequently argued that many places in the South already exhibited characteristics
typically associated with the Third World. Out of the fourteen news articles labeling pre-Katrina
New Orleans as the “Third World,” low literacy, high child/infant mortality and nauseating levels
of poverty were most oft cited linking New Orleans, the Gulf Coast and the Deep South to the
Third World. Low literacy, in both children and adults, was cited in two different articles. 104 Clay
Risen, writing in The Boston Globe, cited a July report that concluded that Alabama, Louisiana
and Mississippi “are tied for the highest infant mortality rate” in the United States. 105 Infant or
child mortality was identified in six articles linking the Gulf Coast to the Third World before
Katrina made landfall. 106 People, from World Bank officials to scholars and the general public,
frequently associated these standards of living with the Third World because of limited access to
resources.
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Five articles within these clusters suggested that the cause of structural inequality was
poor governance. 107 Bruce Nussbaum, quoted in New Straits Times (Malaysia), said that
“’Problems emerged because of deeply flawed organisations beset by poor management, soiled
cultures, and inadequate communication’ - features familiar to the Third World, and now to the
US too.” 108 Associating poor management and neglect with poverty, low literacy and other socalled Third World traits is not unreasonable. These characteristics are so closely linked because
a lack of management or bad governmental management makes possible the conditions where
poverty can flourish.
In sum, the media portrayed New Orleans as a beacon American city on the one hand and
an underdeveloped place not belonging in the United States of America on the other. These two
different representations seem incommensurable. The former paints a magnificent place located
within the responsibility of the United States while the latter portrays a place existing outside of
American purview and standards of living. One explanation for resolving the perceived
contradiction lies in the use of the label itself. Nine different articles allude to a distinction
between appearance and reality, the appearance of industrial greatness eliding over the reality of
an undeveloped despair. 109 Hurricane Katrina’s devastating wrath is described as lifting the
thinly placed veil separating the appearance from reality.
Out of the nine articles implying an appearance-reality relationship, four used “façade”
five times to describe New Orleans, the Gulf Coast and the United States as a place of both the
First World and Third World. 110 Tom Condon, writing in the Hartford Courant (Connecticut),
said “As he [Joel Kotkin] sees it, Hurricane Katrina exposed New Orleans as a Third World city
with a Potemkin Village facade.” 111 Here, Potemkin Village referred to “a pretentiously showy or
imposing façade intended to mask or divert attention from an embarrassing or shabby fact or
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condition. 112 Writing in a different edition of the Hartford Courant (Connecticut), Rinker Buck
provided specificity to the American Potemkin Village, “[T]hese stubborn pockets of urban and
rural poverty had been mostly ignored, hidden behind the facade of Bourbon Street gaiety or the
gleaming casinos and waterfront mansions along the Gulf Coast.” 113 The façade Buck describes
was emblematic of the picture painted of the Gulf Coast before Hurricane Katrina arrived. The
word “façade” was used to distinguish between two different representations, the appearance of
First World living and the reality of Third World conditions.
Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notion of dissociation and their analysis of the
“appearance-reality” pair provide a heuristic for better understanding motives for employing the
“Third World” label. 114 For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, dissociation is a significant
argumentative strategy, because “any new philosophy presupposes the working out of a
conceptual apparatus, at least part of which, that which is fundamentally original, results from a
disassociation of notions that enables the problems the philosopher has set himself to be
solved.” 115 Disassociation operates by establishing, separating, calculating and arranging the
value of differences. Winkler explains this process as the “rendering [of] the disaggregated
elements into the philosophical pairings whereby one term in the pairing surpasses the value of
the other.” 116 While the Third World is not necessarily a philosophical pairing, the use of the
phrase “Third World” within the media coverage of Hurricane Katrina is similarly marked by
disassociation for the purposes of identification and identity construction. Out of the
philosophical pairings discussed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the pair appearance-reality
is given the most attention. Winkler argues that this pair is significant because of its “primacy in
discussions of definition.” 117 Reading the appearance-reality dyad within the clusters of media
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coverage will help to better understand the shifts in meaning and apparent contradictions within
the Third World.
Initially and at first glance of the Third World history, the Third World is employed
against the First World, where the First World is privileged above and beyond the Third World.
Within the development narrative, which popularizes use of the “Third World” label, the First
World has the technological, economic and political prowess, even obligation, to aid and develop
those who are underdeveloped. The First World sets the parameters by which a Third World
country may be defined and the appropriate situation for intervention into a Third World country.
The goal of development is to make the Third World over in the image of the First World. The
relationship is neither reciprocal nor symmetrical. The Third World does maintain the same
power relationship with the First World. The First World is not receptive to demands made by
the Third World and the latter does not have significant influence over the former in international
economic and political forums. The association between the First World and the Third World is
hierarchical, value laden and naturalized.
The “Third World” label in the context of pre-Katrina mainstream mass media coverage
operates within this hegemonic relationship. New Orleans and most of the Gulf Coast area are
treated as a backwards and uncivilized place. New Orleans is described as having fallen back into
an earlier and less developed state. The entire Gulf Coast is portrayed as lacking any of the
necessary and basic needs characteristic of a normal civilization. The representation of New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast as a Third World place disassociates them from the rest of the United
States. In part, this separation works to normalize the American remainder. Hurricane Katrina’s
devastation could not happen in First World America. American identity and values might
unravel if such a tragedy took place within the boundaries of the United States. De-linking New
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Orleans and the Gulf Coast from the United States through the “Third World” label is motivated
by the desire secure one’s identity. Lynn Duke persuasively argues,
They've all been bemoaning how the crisis wrought by Hurricane Katrina reduced a bold
and magical American city to "third-world" status, or had been managed as if by a
bungling "third-world" government. Black folk said it. White folk said it. So many people
said it so often that I realized this was some kind of civic moment, some kind of
revelation of a fundamental, albeit troubling, American value. Put simply, it is this: We
think we are better. And we don't like it one bit when we look like we're not better. 118
Labeling the affected as Third World is supposed to exonerate the First World U.S. from
responsibility. Third World devastation is supposed to happen in a Third World country, not in a
First World country. The Third World continued to be the disparaged label among the media
clusters from the news coverage of Hurricane Katrina.
The use of the “Third World” label is in tension throughout the media coverage of
Katrina’s consequences. On the one hand the Gulf Coast area is portrayed as not the Third
World. New Orleans and the surrounding area are represented as a major American tourist
mecca. The coverage of a pre-Katrina New Orleans maintained the appearance of an ordered
First World place. On the other hand the same Gulf Coast area is represented as both a
longstanding and recently devastated Third World place. The post-Katrina coverage revealed the
Third World characteristics as a long, hidden reality. I have described the relationship between
these clusters as having been implied in the media coverage. The tension is resolved within the
clusters by an understanding that the First World imagery is an appearance for an already existing
Third World reality. New Orleans and the Gulf Coast remained First World on the surface and a
“Third World” place deep down.
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New Orleans Characterized After Hurricane Katrina
Where the previous section analyzed the clusters describing Hurricane Katrina’s arrival,
this section attends specifically to the mass media clusters that depict New Orleans and the Gulf
Coast after Katrina’s landfall. The coverage about the condition on the ground in Katrina’s
aftermath depicted characteristics largely associated with a Third World place. The media no
longer praised the region for its grandness or American character. Neither the Gulf Coast nor
New Orleans resembles any semblance of First World order.
While the media coverage constructed a relatively ordered New Orleans before Hurricane
Katrina, the coverage radically changed after Katrina’s landfall. Twenty-five articles implied a
lack of order when they deployed the “Third World” label to describe the effects of Hurricane
Katrina. Fifteen of those articles portrayed the lack of order described as a sort of chaos made
possible through the absence of infrastructure or supporting authority. Kevin Sullivan, writing in
The Washington Post, cited the headline in the Daily Mail (London), “Third World America;”
followed with the line “Law and order is gone.” 119 Bill Walsh declared in The Times-Picayune
(New Orleans), “Lawlessness became the story Tuesday.” 120 Descriptions of looters coincided
with the lawless scenic conditions in fifteen articles. 121 For example Catherine Elsworth and
Francis Harris, writing for The Daily Telegraph, reported that “New Orleans continued to
resemble a Third World war zone,” as armed looters [were] still roaming.” 122 This notion of a
Third World war zone is not an isolated characteristic. One moves continuously throughout the
mass media coverage from disorder to lawlessness and looting and finally to a war zone, all
descriptions linking New Orleans and the Gulf Coast with the Third World. Staff reporters,
writing for the Times-Picayune (New Orleans), declared early in their coverage of Hurricane
Katrina’s effect on New Orleans, “[T]he city resemble[d] a Third World war zone” and “The
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scene throughout the city retained it's apocalyptic feel.” 123 The scenic Third World characteristics
continued to dominate the representations such that in Leventhal’s letter to The Boston Globe,
she asks “One doesn't need a PhD to know that when a mandatory evacuation of a major city is
ordered, looting and lawlessness are certain to occur. Why weren't a sufficient number of troops
and police poised to go into the city right away and protect and secure the area?” 124 Leventhal
suggests that identifying the problem of lawlessness should have been easy. And the way to reestablish order in the face of chaos should have been automatic, military and police force.
Disorder post-Katrina extended beyond law and order into the realm of health and
sanitation. Twenty-three articles cited the lack of power, clean water and food or the abundance
of rotting bodies, feces or smell of garbage. Paul H.B. Shin, writing as a staff writer for the Daily
News (New York), claimed, “The stench of urine, feces and rotting flesh was overpowering.” 125
In the minds of many, the New Orleans’ Superdome was to blame for much of the filth. The
Superdome was the place where as many evacuees were gathered in an attempt to create a safe
haven for fleeing Katrina’s wrath. But as Nathan Coleman, quoted in Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
(Pennsylvania), said “every nook and cranny was a bathroom.” 126 Coleman continued by
comparing his living conditions to those of individuals in the Third World, “We were living
worse than Third World countries,” he concluded “We were totally forgotten.” 127 Coleman’s
reference is important because of the comparison between First World and Third World.
Coleman not only indicates they are no longer in First World America but now they are in a place
that is worse than Third World conditions. Even though the media coverage did not explicitly
portray a clean or sanitary Gulf Coast in the representations of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast
before Katrina, the characteristics are still relevant to understanding the use of the “Third World”
label. The absence of clean and sterile representations before Katrina’s landfall could be
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explained because one would not necessarily report that New Orleans is a clean American city.
Or better, media reports would not highlight the efficacy of the sewer and sanitary system. These
characteristics are not extracted because they are presumed part of the American or First World
portrayal. The clean representations function in the First World as the silent norm against which
deviations are contrasted. The emphasis in the clustered relationships about sanitation juxtaposes
First World appearances against Third World realities.
Third World Motivations: Labeling a Third World Place
In the media coverage following Hurricane Katrina, the “Third World” label used to
describe the characteristics of the Gulf Coast is best rooted in its scenic qualities. The Third
World is frequently set as the scene or background where acts are set in motion. Burke writes,
“Besides general synonyms for scene that are obviously of a background character, such as
“society,” or “environment,” we often encounter quite specific localizations, words for particular
places, situations, or eras.” 128 Whether depicting before or after Hurricane Katrina, the media
references to societal structures and other grounding characteristics exemplify scene as the
dominant term. In the mainstream news media, New Orleans and the Gulf Coast become the
localized scene or environment. The different acts which take place occur against the backdrop of
the Gulf Coast. Put another way, “one could say that “the scene contains the act.”” 129 In short, the
varying acts described in the media coverage may, in part, be attributed to the scene. While
scene-act is consistently the motivating ratio, the scene-act motivations manifest differently in
the media coverage depicting the affected areas before and after Hurricane Katrina.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s explanation of the appearance-reality distinction and
argumentative strategy of disassociation accounts for the different scene-act motivations in media
coverage of Hurricane Katrina. In the coverage reporting a pre-Katrina New Orleans and Gulf
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Coast, the First World is the dominant apparent scene while the Third World remains the hidden
scene. New Orleans is portrayed as an extravagant American city. The scene is defined by glitz,
glamour, Mardi Gras and casinos. The media coverage did not go into great detail about the acts
taking place on the First World scene. The mass media was not likely focused on First World
acts because the media coverage took place after Hurricane Katrina had made landfall, even
though the stories were referencing a pre-Katrina New Orleans and Gulf Coast. However, one
can extrapolate how the acts would have been described given the scenic First World
characteristics and the Third World acts in later scenes. The acts on the First World scene would
have been grounded in privilege, economic advancement and responsibility, even if merely in
appearance. One might have read about technological advances, new infrastructure or enjoying
the pleasure of excess (like gambling, shopping and drinking).
The Third World scene did not play a role on the surface but functioned as a background
scene. The Third World characteristics were more structural than immediate. The effects of
poverty and failed local development policies did not happen in a month, a year or even a
generation. Infant mortality statistics are determined in the present but the policies or attitudes
that make high infant mortality (or illiteracy) rates possible take place over time, long periods of
time. In these clusters, the Third World scene is something that always already existed but was
kept out of sight. Hurricane Katrina did not make the Gulf Coast into a Third World place, the
effects of Katrina revealed what was already a Third World place.
A scenic shift occurs within the coverage of Hurricane Katrina. Whereas the appearance
of scene prevailed pre-Katrina, the reality of scene dominated after Katrina’s landfall. The
timeframe and magnitude of Hurricane Katrina’s impact forced a confrontation between the
appearance of a First World place and the very same place’s Third World reality. The Third
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World scene before Katrina is set as an unmentioned reality, a scene extending through the past.
The reporting on the legacy of the South is an example of how the Third World place operated
scenically as once hidden but was now very real. The Southern scene produced Southern acts;
farming, dependency and disorder. Current conditions of poverty and rampant decay are traced
back to ”a conservative political culture distrustful of government, combined with the residual
effects of slavery and Jim Crow.” 130 The status quo New Orleans and remaining Gulf Coast are
in a sense rooted or set in motion as a result of their scenic reality.
This study identifies several possible motivating factors for constructing and reporting
about New Orleans and the Gulf Coast as a First World appearance unsettled by a Third World
reality. First, a potential motivation for employing the “Third World” label in this fashion is to
remove responsibility from those in the immediate present. In this world, agents in the present
cannot be held accountable for damages because history and structural problems are responsible.
People in the status quo are able to hold racist legacies of development and structural inequalities
responsible for Hurricane Katrina’s consequences. This motivational strategy is a way to shift
blame from one self and the present to the past for one of the most tragic disasters in the history
of the United States.
A second possible motivating force is change. The potential for change can be motivation
because it gives hope for the future. If one is able to trace the current problems back in time then
arguably something could have been done. Some change could have been made to prevent
tragedy. We had the statistics on poverty, the infant mortality rates and even reports suggesting
the consequences of a severe hurricane strike to the Gulf Coast. If the current situation has not
always been present then the status quo can be changed. If the Gulf Coast’s Third World
characteristics are a result of policies and attitudes that were not always there, presumably if we
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removed or reversed said attitudes and policies, we could proceed down a different path.
Knowing that the present place or situation is not natural but a result of choices and decisions
made in the past, makes altering the status quo possible.
A third conceivable driving force is the exigency of crisis. The media coverage shifted
from the appearance of a First World country to the reality of Third World conditions because of
the need to communicate immediate situations to persons of interest. The exigency of crisis can
also be used to motivate the desire for order. Recall Wood’s explanation of the power of labels.
Employing the immediate characteristics of a Third World place sets in motion a securitizing or
ordering set of subsequent actions. Characterizing the Gulf Coast as a lawless place resembling a
Third World war zone is not neutral. Portraying New Orleans and the Gulf Coast as disordered,
chaotic and anarchic prefigures a response or set of behaviors designed to bring order. The
ordering motivation is rooted in the development doctrine. The desire to order is partially
grounded in the First World view that the Third World is an inferior and disorganized place, a
threat to First World and American order. In the context of Hurricane Katrina, the label “Third
World” is deployed to help bring law and order to an anarchic and violent place.
A fourth reason for employing Third World scenery to describe New Orleans and the
Gulf Coast is to justify the acts taking place. Under normal circumstances, taking food from a
closed (and abandoned) grocery store, not bathing for a week or staying on a roof might seem
ridiculous or even unlawful. But if the scene is changed to one of a Third World place, typically
unexplainable acts are in a sense justified by the scene. Burke explains “[O]ne may deflect
attention from the criticism of personal motives by deriving an act or attitude not from traits of
the agent but from the nature of the situation.” 131 One can blame the Third World scene for
producing Third World acts.
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Empathetic identification is the fifth and final motivating factor this chapter identifies for
the mainstream media use of the “Third World” label and its attendant characteristics. The
motivations for employing Third World were not merely negative. In a very real sense, the effects
of Hurricane Katrina helped peoples across the world, including the United States, identify with
one another. People all over America attempted to pitch in support; whether money, time or other
resources. Betsy Hammond reported one such story,
In Childress, Texas, they got their first handout from a stranger --a convenience store
clerk who saw their Louisiana license plates and gave them a box of food and cold drinks.
Eugene wanted to cry with dismay. “You realize you're at the bottom of the barrel,” he
says, “like someone you'd see on TV in a Third World country.” 132
Being portrayed as below or distant from the First World does have its benefits for a
humanitarian response. The “Third World” label works to invoke identification from audience
members, similar to an infomercial on television asking for donations. Readers were asked to see
themselves as one of the helpless and desperate. If something this tragic could happen to a part of
the First World United States, Third World devastation could happen to anyone, including the
consumers of the media campaign. Audience Third World identification helped to make the
tragedy more real for First World America. Empathetic identification also provided much needed
sympathy and assistance for those affected by Hurricane Katrina.
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CHAPTER 3.
HURRICANE KATRINA AND THIRD WORLD INSTITUTIONS
The purpose of examining the concept of ‘Third World’ is that one can gain a preliminary insight
into some of the problems experienced by such countries by examining the validity of using a
single category for such an amorphous group.
B.C. Smith 133
This chapter focuses on labeling government actors as if they were governing a Third
World state or as if they embodied Third World characteristics. The cluster analysis emphasizes
the characteristics deployed by the mainstream mass media when referencing the local, state and
federal institutions. Before one can access any potential motivations for labeling a government
entity “Third World,” a brief understanding of Third World state characterizations is necessary.
After the short introduction to the Third World state, I will organize and analyze the government
focused clusters in the mainstream mass media coverage of Hurricane Katrina. Finally, I discuss
potential motivations for why the mainstream mass media might label different government
actors as Third World, especially in the wake of Hurricane Katrina’s so-called Third World
devastation of a First World country.
Third World States
While the history of the label “Third World” emerged from within an international
context of a geopolitics focused on the nation-state, this predominant emphasis on the nationstate was in contrast to the origins of the “Third World” label. General consensus is that Alfred
Sauvy, the originator of the term, used the “Third World” label in the early 1950s referring back
to the French Revolution’s Third Estate. 134 The Third Estate’s reference is important because the
Third Estate label did not describe a nation-state or state institution. The Third Estate referred to
a population within a nation. The label represented the subgroup of the population that was
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excluded within France, but wanted to be included. Even though the “Third World” label first
appears in reference to an internal population, the excluded characteristic of the Third Estate
remains in more modern instantiations of the label’s meaning.
A number of events contributed toward the shift in usage from the Third Estate’s internal
population to a predominantly state-centered Third World. I do not describe the events in strict
chronological order because they overlap (in time and the events themselves) and each
contributes, but does not determine the shifts, in using the “Third World” label. First, the
contours of World War II helped shape the emerging Third World state. Hadjor argues the
events following World War II laid the impetus for understanding the Third World. Hadjor
writes,
[B]efore 1945 little attention was given to the study of the history or social and economic
reality of the Third World… After the Second World War all this was turned upside
down. A war which originated among the traditionally strong European powers had the
ironic result of shaking the nineteenth-century colonial system to its foundations. 135
The previously excluded internal populations were given an opportunity for inclusion in the wake
of World War II. Many of the traditional colonial powers involved in the war lost the power they
held over their respective colonies. Populations internal to the colonial state (who have been
excluded) were enabled to advance strong claims against their respective colonialist states. Peter
Worsley explains:
Inevitably the ‘Third Force’ now became a world, not a European category, and now at
the level of states: a Third World, led by three countries: by India, newly independent; by
Egypt, which had converted formal into real independence of Britain; and by Yugoslavia
which had broken from the Cominform. 136
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The dissolution of colonialist hegemony radically altered the geopolitical world after World War
II. New nation states emerged that were once under the yoke of colonial powers. These states no
longer relied on or were forced to answer to colonialist powers. The newly formed post-colonial
states helped transition the meaning of the Third World away from an excluded internal
population toward a nation-state focus.
Second, the colonialist struggles of the twenty-first century contributed to the shifts in the
meaning of the Third World. The characteristics associated with Third World states are, in part, a
result of this struggle from an excluded internal population to a post-colonial state. Many of these
Third World states were dependent on agriculture for their economic livelihood. 137 The benefits
and consequences of industrialism had, for the most part, not yet reached the people of the Third
World. Southern geography, as the last chapter suggests, contributed to a reliance on agriculture
because the tropical climate provided the foundation for a strong agricultural society. As a result,
many countries had not yet developed the technological advancements, standards of living or
infrastructure other First and Second World countries enjoyed. Over time, the lack of an
advanced infrastructure and reliance on agriculture emerged to characterize the colonized Third
World states.
Poverty is closely associated with the Third World. Smith argues “Low per capita
incomes have been related historically to the Third World’s economic dependence on
agriculture.” 138 Without the means to create and maintain an independent internal infrastructure,
the Third World countries were frequently not able to move beyond their agricultural economies.
A lack of wealth is not just a founding characteristic of Third World countries, but as Smith
further claims, “[p]overty continues to be a real and significant feature of Third World
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countries.” 139 The exclusion of these Third World populations and countries from First and
Second World politics made it nearly impossible to better their economic situations.
These newly formed nation-states and former colonies were also characterized by
conflict, violence and even internal racism. On the one hand, the internally excluded populations
struggled (often violently) against the colonialist states. For example, Worsley cites Egypt, India
and Yugoslavia as countries that have experienced anti-colonialist or authoritarian uprisings. To
the First and Second World, these domestic disputes, however revolutionary, were perceived as
disorderly and chaotic. Cowen and R.W. Shenton claim, “It was the turmoil and fear of
revolution in the first half of the nineteenth century that gave birth to the idea of development
and it is these unexplored origins that are the source of much present-day confusion about
development’s meaning.” 140 The often violent change and revolutions in the Third World were a
threat to the order, stability and security of the First and Second Worlds. To accommodate these
threats, the First and Second World offered development, assistance and even provided or
supported their own government officials.
On the other hand, the diversity of the previously excluded internal population
complicated the matter. Nelson Kasfir suggests that in most Third World countries, “[M]ajority
rule by competitive parties has frequently degenerated into authoritarian government.” 141 Often
the formerly oppressed populations visited the same oppression on their own peoples. Rupert
Emerson explains, “Regrettably, there is not even evidence that peoples who themselves have
suffered oppression and exploitation have in any time or place learned a lasting lesson which
forbids them to exploit and oppress other peoples within or outside their own society or
polity.” 142 Even when a population was unified against the colonialist-state, that very same

47
population was frequently divided about questions like how the struggle should take place or
what should follow the revolution. McCall explains,
All the models proposed so far, however, take as given the legitimacy of the state as the
basic unit of analysis, ignoring the fact that there are many more nations in the world than
there are states for them. That is, that though colonialism is no longer present in its classic
form, many ethnic minorities find themselves still victims of what people call, today,
‘internal’ colonialism. 143
While some post World War II revolutionary struggles successfully dismantled violent or
oppressive colonialist states, other populations suffered from internal colonialism. Unfortunately,
the Third World internal colonialism frequently took on the form of the same racism prevalent
from the nation’s former European colonialists. Rajeev Patel and Philip McMichael argue these
new Third World rulers governed by “[C]ombining forms of urban power directly excluding
natives from civil freedoms on racial grounds with forms of indirect rule of natives in the
countryside via a reconstruction of tribal authority.” 144 Regardless of the form of colonialism, the
colonialist struggle helped to influence the meaning of the Third World state. Violence,
corruption, chaos, revolution, racism and disorder all became defining characteristics of the Third
World.
Third, United States President Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural address’ declaration of the
American development program significantly shaped the meaning and emergence of the Third
World state. President Truman described the object of his new program of development as “the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.” 145 In the political vacuum left by World War
II, President Truman identified an opportunity that could grow American hegemony and also
could “greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations and [could] raise substantially their
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standards of living.” 146 The underdeveloped or Third World characteristics of poverty, weak
industry and a general low standard of living was both explicit and implied throughout Truman’s
address. The President also laid out the security reasons for developing the Third World.
President Truman argued,
We are moving on with other nations to build an even stronger structure of international
order and justice. We shall have as our partners countries which, no longer solely
concerned with the problem of national survival, are now working to improve the
standards of living of all their people. 147
The President acknowledged the previous struggles against international threats to national
survival because of its timing after the end of World War II. Nations no longer faced exclusively
external threats, but also threats from within their own state from previously excluded
populations and those suffering from poor living conditions. President Truman continued,
“Slowly but surely we are weaving a world fabric of international security and growing
prosperity.” 148 Together, these circumstances led to the First and Second Worlds, culminating in
the President’s inaugural address’ view of the underdeveloped Third World as disorderly, chaotic
and a threat to worldwide peace and economic prosperity.
Finally, the politics of the Cold War contributed to shifts in the meaning associated with
the Third World state. Muni argues, “The concept of the Third World, as initially used, carried
specific political and power connotations in the context of the cold war and power bloc
politics.” 149 Specifically, the meaning of the Third World state was in line with Sauvy’s Third
Estate namely, the excluded or non-aligned countries and/or states. Smith claims, “The original
meaning of the term ‘Third World’ referred to a group of non-aligned countries outside the great
power blocks.” 150 From the beginnings of the Cold War, the Third World constituted those
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countries and nation-states not affiliated with the largely democratic First World or mostly
communist Second World.
The institutionalization of the Cold War also significantly changed the understanding of
the Third World state. Where previous political affiliations characterized Third World states, the
decreasing importance of these ideological struggles helped transition the meaning of the Third
World. Wolf-Phillips argues that the predominant Third World meanings shifted “with the
lessening of the tensions of the Cold War period and the creation of scores of new and
independent sovereign states in the 1960’s and early 1970’s.” 151 The focus on political affiliation
was less important within the strife, turmoil and low standards of living in these newly formed
nation-states. The First and Second Worlds no longer over-determined who constituted the
primary threat to survival. The growing chaos in the previously neglected and underdeveloped
segments of the world was perceived as an increasing threat to peace and stability in the First and
Second Worlds. The newfound (or re-discovered) attention for the Third World transformed the
Third World from a neglected or non-aligned political entity to an explicitly recognized threat
and economically underdeveloped object.
World War II, the emergence of the post-colonial state, U.S. President Harry S. Truman’s
inaugural address and the Cold War were all instrumental in transforming the meaning of the
Third World. These events helped alter Sauvy’s original use of the Third Force or Third World.
The Third World, once the internally excluded population within a nation-state, came to refer to a
nation-state imbued with certain characteristics. The characteristics, as this historical foray
demonstrates, of Third World nation-states were largely due to the transition from one form of
exclusion to another. The characteristics associated with the Third World state came to mean
corruption, incompetence, volatility, poverty, agricultural dependence, un or under-development,
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backwardness, chaos, lacking resources and even negligence or oppression of one’s own people.
Comprehending the different Third World associations and evolution of the Third World nationstate will help better contextualize the mainstream mass media’s use of the Third World in the
context of Hurricane Katrina and the respective state institutions involved.
The Third World as State in Katrina Coverage
For clarity, I divide the clustered Third World references in the media coverage of
Hurricane Katrina’s landfall by level of government entity. The first set of Third World clusters
center around the local New Orleans and state of Louisiana government. The second arrangement
of clusters describes President George W. Bush and the federal government as displaying or
embodying characteristics typically associated with the Third World nation-state. By examining
similarities and difference between these two subsets we can better understand the motives for
employing the “Third World” label to describe institutions.
New Orleans and Louisiana Government as a Third World State
The mass media coverage reporting on the arrival and aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
associated the Third World with local government in eleven different articles. The local
government was defined as the government institutions (and their representatives) from New
Orleans, the state of Louisiana and the state of Florida. Only one of the eleven articles mentioned
Florida. From these eleven articles, three general characteristics described the local government
state institutions as Third World. First, the local government emerged as disorganized and
lacking leadership. An editorial in The Oregonian (Portland, Oregon) wrote “No American city
can be fully prepared for this kind of disaster, but the response in New Orleans was stunningly
slow and confused. Today New Orleans looks, and behaves, like a Third World nation, not one
of America's proudest cities.” 152 The Oregonian acknowledged that Hurricane Katrina’s
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magnitude was reason enough for some initial hesitation, but went on to argue that no American
city would have treated its people so poorly. The editorial explicitly claimed that only a Third
World nation would respond to such a catastrophe with slow and confused actions. As such, the
Third World nation was once again juxtaposed to America, where adjectives like stranded and
desperate characterized the relationship between the Third World New Orleans government and
its people.
The state of Louisiana, specifically Governor Kathleen Blanco, was also blamed for an
awkward and inept response to Hurricane Katrina. Sherry M. Leventhal, editorializing in The
Boston Globe, says the following about Governor Blanco and Louisiana’s reaction to the
consequences of Katrina:
The governor of Louisiana is equally to blame for the gross mismanagement of relief
efforts. When she should have been exhibiting leadership and strength, she came across
as overwhelmed and inept. Her lack of organization and planning for hurricane relief in a
state that is so vulnerable to storms of this magnitude is appalling. When asked what she
would like to tell the people of Louisiana who were desperate for help, she said that she
would like to tell them to pray. 153
Leventhal’s clear disgust represented the anger and frustration many felt toward the local
government. Mismanaged and overwhelmed characterized the local government’s reaction to the
utter devastation. Leventhal explicitly blamed Governor Blanco, implying that the consequences
could have been avoided if the local government had acted differently. Blanco’s weak inaction
was juxtaposed against strong characteristics. The media coverage revealed more comparisons of
an unorganized and awkward government against the desires for a strong, efficient and capable
government.
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Second, the mass media coverage emphasized corruption as a characteristic linking the
local government with Third World institutions. The Washington Post reported an exchange
between Larry Craig, a Republican senator from Idaho, and Cesar Burgos, a New Orleans’
lawyer, highlighting the accusations of corruption:
Sen. Larry E. Craig (R-Idaho), a member of the Appropriations Committee that will dole
out recovery money, told Idaho's Lewiston Morning Tribune that "fraud is in the culture
of Iraqis. I believe that is true in the state of Louisiana as well. . . . Louisiana and New
Orleans are the most corrupt governments in our country and they always have been."
Cesar R. Burgos, a New Orleans lawyer on the mayor's rebuilding commission, believes
the city is being punished by Craig and others for the sins of its political past. "It's
frustrating to hear the same thing over and over as if we're some unorganized Third
World country," Burgos said. "Don't kick somebody when they're down." 154
Without hesitation, Senator Craig linked the governments in New Orleans and Louisiana to a
culture of corruption. While the senator asserted that the corruption ran deep, the corruption in
question regards rebuilding the devastated areas. At stake was billions of dollars in state and
other contracts for cleaning up and developing the impacted areas. Hurricane Katrina struck the
Gulf Coast at a time when the United States was pre-occupied with the war on terrorism,
specifically the removal of Saddam Hussien from Iraq. The U.S. liberation and subsequent
development of Iraq had raised similar questions about corruption. Individuals across the world
were inquiring about how certain companies received sole source, mega contracts. The senator
implied that Third World governments like Iraq and Louisiana were corrupt, whereas First World
or non-Third World institutions were law abiding.
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In response to Senator Craig’s accusations, Cesar Burgos identified the bigotry. Burgos’
reaction is interesting, not because he identifies the bigotry attributed to the Third World but
because he refuted whether or not New Orleans and Louisiana were definitionally the Third
World. He implied that Craig was correct about the Third World being corrupt and unorganized
but it was not as if the Gulf Coast is really the Third World. The media exchange between Craig
and Burgos demonstrated the clear association between corruption and the Third World and the
value judgment that the “Third World” label was a derogatory label.
Third, the media coverage also characterized the local government as incompetent in their
handling of Hurricane Katrina. Incompetence described the local government’s actions both
before and after Katrina’s landfall. Z. Dwight Billingsly articulated the sentiment portraying the
New Orleans and Louisiana’s ineptitude prior to Katrina,
In New Orleans, despite advance warnings of up to five days, an incompetent black
Democratic male mayor and an incompetent white Democratic female governor -- not our
president -- were the cause of too much unnecessary suffering. Regardless how one views
the disparate impact of the hurricane across racial and class lines, in Louisiana,
incompetence knows no racial or gender boundaries. 155
In this case, the writer explicated the link between incompetence and ignorant negligence.
Implicitly, incompetence was tied to party lines, Democratic versus Republican.
Media sources also blame local government for incompetence after Katrina’s arrival. The
New York Times reported incompetence regarding the allocation of funds and institutional
support, when it noted,
That kind of attitude toward federal procedures may not inspire confidence as billions of
dollars head their way to Louisiana. As it is, the state's chronic underfinancing of
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services, its poor educational system and a low-wage job base have led to frequent
complaints that Louisiana resembles a third world nation. 156
Incompetence here constituted poor investment of funds. The New York Times accused the
Louisiana of resembling a Third World state because of the way it chooses to allocate money.
The characteristic of incompetence is directly linked to the Third World state, linking poorly
developed infrastructures with calculated government decisions.
President Bush and the Federal Government as a Third World State
The media coverage of Hurricane Katrina revealed that the federal government embodied
Third World characteristics in twenty different articles. Out of those twenty articles, eleven
specifically referenced American President George W. Bush. I draw out three types of
characteristics emblematic of the associations attributed to the federal government. First, the
federal government was characterized as slow, disorganized, bureaucratic and unprepared for
Katrina’s consequences. The Guardian (London) provided an international perspective on the
U.S. federal government’s fumbled reaction to Katrina,
It [Hurricane Katrina] has also exposed the United States government, and George Bush
at the head of it, to charges of badly mishandling what looks like being one of the
country's worst ever natural disasters...America is the richest and most powerful country
on earth. But its citizens, begging for food, water and help, are suffering agonies more
familiar from Sudan and Niger. The worst of the third world has come to the Big Easy. 157
Critics across the globe accused the Bush Administration of so mishandling the federal
government’s response that the government is compared to the Third World, enabling travesties
typically associated with the Third World to happen. America was presented as rich and
powerful, implying that the United States or a First World country would have had all of the
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resources available to protect and provide for its citizens. In comparison, Third World
governments could not be organized or resourceful enough to prevent starvation and suffering
from happening to its citizens. The “Third World” label was employed here to describe a
fundamental breakdown in the relationship between the government and its citizens.
Second, the federal government’s response to Katrina was characterized in the media as
incompetence. The Boston Herald reported that Oxfam America President Raymond Offenheiser
“[b]lamed the inadequate government response on deep cuts in the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's budget over the years. ``It's about a failure of leadership and a failure to
fund the institutions adequately for them to meet their missions,'' Offenheiser said.” 158
Offenheiser’s perspective is unique because of his status as President of Oxfam America, “an old
hand at Third World disaster recovery.” 159 Offenheiser’s Third World commentary portrays the
U.S. government’s negligence as systemic rather than mere short-sightedness.
Mismanagement extended beyond passive negligence. Media coverage also reported
critics who suggested that the government was guilty of active and malicious ineptitude. The
Nelson Mail (New Zealand) wrote,
Scenes of human suffering that are more commonly associated with the Third World have
been relentlessly displayed across the United States and around the globe. The richest
nation has been shown to be poorly equipped to quickly help its own people and to be
unforgivably ill-prepared for a disaster that everyone, apparently, knew was likely to
happen. Worse, its inept handling of this human crisis has given rise to a widespread
belief that the government does not care about the poor blacks who have been most
seriously affected. 160
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Third World associations not typically ascribed to the United States were being continuously
displayed throughout the mainstream media coverage following Hurricane Katrina. The Nelson
Mail (New Zealand) editorial argued that the U.S. actions went beyond negligence. The Third
World characteristics described represent the governmentally sponsored oppression of a
subgroup of the population.
Third, the press labeled the U.S. federal government as racist for its conduct in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The executive director of the State Commission on African
American Affairs Rosalund Jenkins was quoted in The Seattle Times proclaiming, “I'll say it if
nobody else is willing. I happen to think if those tens of thousands had been 90 percent white and
10 percent black instead of the other way around, the government's response would've been
faster.” 161 Jenkins was not alone in ascribing a racist motive to the government’s response after
Katrina. A growing worldwide sentiment was reported in The Washington Post,
International reaction has shifted in many cases from shock, sympathy and generosity to a
growing criticism of the Bush administration's response to the catastrophe of Hurricane
Katrina. In nations often divided by dueling sentiments of admiration and distaste for the
United States, many people see at best incompetence and at worst racism in the chaos
gripping much of the Gulf Coast. 162
The media blamed the government’s active neglect and ignorance of whole segments of poor,
black people for a slow and disorganized disaster relief effort. Judie Lopez is quoted in the San
Antonio Express-News expressing disgust,
It is a national disgrace that days after Katrina, there are people living in the most
horrendous conditions in New Orleans. The richest nation in the world takes days to
begin to evacuate people from that ravaged city. Where was Homeland Security? Where
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was George W. Bush? Shame, shame. We have become like Third World countries that
care only about the upper tier of their society. 163
Lopez’ editorial established two important relationships. On the one hand, the United States was
initially characterized as a rich nation separate and different from the Third World. On the other
hand, America became a Third World country, defined by disgrace, horrendous conditions and a
government that only considers the interests of elite.
Third World Motivations: Labeling a Third World State
I employ cluster analysis to better understand the different ways and possible motivations
for which the “Third World” label is used throughout the media reporting surrounding Hurricane
Katrina. In this chapter, I focus on how the “Third World” label was used to describe and
characterize the varying levels of government involvement leading up to and following Katrina’s
landfall. Using the emergence and history of the Third World state institution as a background, I
have highlighted the relationships in the media coverage between characteristics historically
attributed to the Third World and the reported features of the government’s reaction to Katrina.
In this section, I analyze these relationships to articulate possible motives for identifying and
labeling a government entity as a Third World state.
The local, state and federal governments described throughout the post-Katrina media
coverage were described as agents embodying characteristics or carrying out acts historically
ascribed to the Third World state. The media portrayed the local New Orleans and Louisiana
governments as Third World because they were acting disorganized, corrupt, incompetent and
without leadership. The media depicted the United States federal government as Third World
because it came across as slow, unorganized, bureaucratic, incompetent, negligent and racist.
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Burke’s agent-agency ratio helps explain the relationship between these government entities and
their reported attributes and characteristics. While agents may embody actions like eating a
sandwich, agents also contain agency or the means by which an agent carries out an act. In the
sandwich eating example, the agent could be eating hastily or idly because the agent is motivated
by starvation or driven by an illness. The agency or characteristics associated with the act in this
example are haste and idleness. In the context of this study, the government entities are the
agents in the media coverage and the traits associated with the government agents, like
disorganization, mismanagement, corruption, racism, etc, are the agencies within the agentagency ratio. Burke elaborates,
Meanwhile, we should be reminded that the term agent embraces not only all words
general or specific for person, actor, character, individual, hero, villain, father, doctor,
engineer, but also words, moral or functional, for patient, and words for the motivational
properties or agents, such as “drives,” “instincts,” “states of mind.” We may also have
collective words for agent, such as nation, group.” 164
For this study, Burke’s insight on the range of meaning available in depictions of actors can be
interpreted as the governmental characteristics or how the government as an agent reported,
represented or carried itself in relationship to the Gulf Coast. The agencies in this ratio were both
active and inactive. For example, disorganized responses, mismanaged relief efforts and
corruption were active agencies. Negligence and ignorance were still agencies, even if they were
demonstrated passively or through not acting.
Burke’s example of “the resistance of the Russian armies to the Nazi invasion” provides a
heuristic for understanding the clusters in terms of agent-agency and not scene-agent. 165 In the
example, the Russian resistance was explained scenically if one was crediting Russian resistance
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to Socialism. Socialism was playing the part of the scenic background within which the acts of
resistance were contained. However; if one was linking the acts of resistance to Russian character
traits, the act of resistance was deduced from the agent – “these are essentially motives located in
the agent, hence requiring no acknowledgement of socialist motives.” 166 While this analysis
privileges the agent-agency ratio and not the act-agent ratio, Burke’s comparison provides good
support why the motivations were in the agent and not the scene. The scenic qualities of the
Third World were nowhere to be found in the clusters that described the government institutions
in the media coverage. This analysis identified agents who were disorganized, mismanaged,
incompetent, inept, racist and corrupt. If the “Third World” state labels were motivated
scenically, the media coverage would have revealed references to the Third World scene; like
non-alliance, resistance, democracy, socialism, capitalism and communism.
The agent-agency ratio explains the relationship between the government characteristics
and the motives for employing the “First World” and “Third World” labels throughout the media
coverage of Hurricane Katrina. Recall the The Oregonian editorial that claimed New Orleans was
behaving like a Third World nation, no longer a proud American city. New Orleans went from a
government agent characterized by pride and being American to a government agent who was
slow and confused. This relationship was consistent throughout the coverage. The government,
whether local, state or federal, was a First World American government described in the media as
typically competent and responsive to the needs of its people. Following Katrina’s landfall, the
media stopped reporting any First World agencies and largely depicted descriptions more
indicative of Third World governments. While the agent stayed the same, the agencies or
reported characteristics and labels used to describe them changed.
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Critique, blame and responsibility were the main motives for employing the “Third
World” label to characterize government agencies in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Burke
notes that “[O]ne may deflect attention from scenic matters by situating the motives of an act in
the agent.” 167 While it was not the acts themselves that were labeled Third World, the agency or
the means for carrying out the government actions were reported as Third World. Deflecting
attention or blame away from the scene onto an agent has two important implications. First, the
scene was much more difficult to intervene into or change. If the United States, as the scene, had
become or was always already the Third World, the American dream failed. Indicting the scene
as a problem or cause of the disastrous status quo implicates a way of life, in a sense everyone
would become culpable. Revealing America, capitalism or democracy as the conditions that
made possible a tremendous catastrophe is not going to inspire change in anyone. On the
contrary, if the Third World was identified in an agency, the agent can change. For example, the
government stopped delaying action as a response to Katrina and started calling in different
agencies and troops to bring relief and order. Or in the extreme, if the Third World was linked to
the agent through their agency, an agent can be removed. One witnessed this strategy in President
Bush’s removal of Federal Emergency Management Agency Director Michael Brown. Also,
Bush’s mishandling of Hurricane Katrina was identified as a key turning point in his popularity
and the consequent election of President Barak Obama.
Second, the difference in agencies ascribed to the federal versus the local agents revealed
a motive rooted in power imbalances. The local New Orleans and Louisiana governments were
characterized as corrupt while the federal government was described as racist. Corruption, in a
sense, implied that one is lacking power and resources. Racism suggested, however, that one was
in a position of power and had the resources at hand to treat another population maliciously. The
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results of this analysis seemed to put more blame and responsibility on the federal government
than on the local. The number of articles citing either the local or the federal agents responsible
validated this conclusion. Remember that only eleven articles reported the local authorities
embodying Third World characteristics whereas the federal government was blamed in twenty
articles for responding with Third World agency. In attributing corruption to the local
government and racism to the federal government, the media coverage placed a larger burden of
responsibility and blame on the federal government than on the local government.
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CHAPTER 4.
HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE PEOPLE OF THE THIRD WORLD
To remove people from their own story as a precondition for their access to publicly managed
resources and services is a central feature of the political disorganization of subordinated classes.
Authoritative labelling, defining the boundaries of competence or relevance in policy fields and
bureaucratic encounters, has this function. Within the donative discourse of development policy,
programmes are directed towards activity which is weakly linked or de-linked by ideological
representation or practice to multidimensional systems of exchange or social structural history.
The donative discourse brings the notion of development very close to relief and charity – people
become ‘refugees’, itinerants’, ‘slum dwellers’, vagrants’ and so on.
Geof Wood 168
The aim of this chapter is to analyze how the mass media employed the “Third World”
label to portray the people of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast in their coverage of Hurricane
Katrina. To accomplish this, I will first lay out a brief understanding of the “Third World” label
and its characterizations of a Third World people. I will then organize and examine the clusters
describing a Third World people in the media coverage of Hurricane Katrina. Finally, I will draw
conclusions for why the people of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast might have been labeled as
Third World.
An Introduction to the People of the Third World
The historical relationship between the people living in the Third World and the “Third
World” label is rooted in the development doctrine. The origins of the modern Third World
emanate from practices of development. American President Harry S Truman’s inaugural address
ushered in the modern era of development. President Truman stated,
I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store
of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life.
And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas
needing development. 169
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In conjunction with other developed countries the U.S. appointed itself the guarantor of
improvement for people’s lives. The improvement or development assistance was defined by
President Truman in terms of American technical knowledge and capital investment. Only those
populations who qualified as peace-loving would be the recipients of the American outlined
development. Tucker evaluates this program of development as domination: “Development is the
process whereby other peoples are dominated and their identities are shaped according to an
essentially Western way of conceiving and perceiving the world. The development discourse is
part of an imperial process whereby other peoples are appropriated and turned into objects.” 170
The development initiatives characterized by President Truman’s inaugural address fit Tucker’s
description of imperialist development practices. The lives President Truman was concerned with
were only considered salvageable if they were peace-loving. The underdeveloped peoples were
treated as objects, upon which American technological knowledge could shape their identities
according to standards of the already developed world.
The emphasis on development recast the people from underdeveloped to members of the
Third World. Prior to this shift, the connotations surrounding the underdeveloped label were
becoming negative and increasingly unpopular. Hadjor explains,
The attraction of the term [Third World] has partly been due to its seeming avoidance of
the static and often negative connotations of other terms used to encapsulate the same
areas of the world. Before the term ‘Third World’ appeared, a very different vocabulary
held the field. World like ‘backward’, ‘underdeveloped’, ‘uncivilized’, ‘primitive’, even
‘barbarian’ or ‘savage’, abounded and expressed both the traditions of Western
superiority, whether it be in a racist or paternalist version. 171
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Here, Hadjor advances two important claims. First, development practitioners, academics and
policymakers altered their way of describing Truman’s underdeveloped populations. They
recognized that referring to a people as savage or inferior as a justification for assisting them
down the path of progress was becoming unacceptable. Second, Hadjor emphasized the “Third
World” label only seemed to avoid the older negative colonialist assumptions that accompanied
the underdeveloped label. The “Third World” label was preferred because the label was deemed
more natural. Instead of referring to the people as savages or barbarians, the people were
described as poor and uneducated, demographics that could be proven scientifically and
economically. Whole industries and even global institutions emerged around these naturalized
and scientifically sound categories. In them, the “Third World” label transcended such antiquated
understandings of world and community politics but, in practice, the “Third World” label
reinforced characteristics associated with people of the underdeveloped world.
“Violent” and “criminal” were two of the adjectives associated with people of the Third
World. In part, the crime description was rooted in economic stagnation. With constant
instability permeating the lives of these individuals, resorting to crime was commonplace.
Caroline O. N. Moser argues, “Residents in all three developing country contexts perceived an
escalation in levels of crime and violence, which they attributed to increasing unemployment,
particularly among young men, and growing drug and alcohol abuse.” 172 While crime has often
been accompanied by violence, a different kind of violence was also associated with people of
the Third World. The violence was often linked to the people’s revolutionary past, anticolonialism or internal conflict. Lawrence Neuman and Ronald J. Berger claim, “They [Third
World social formations] are less industrialized, have lower standards of living, and are the sites
of recent wars and rebellions.” 173 Whether the motivating factors were hunger, economic
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necessity, political oppression or survival, the people of the Third World were often
characterized as engaged in criminal activity and violent behavior.
Despite attempted shifts by academics, policymakers and other interested parties to
change the associated characteristics, the Third World people remained an object for intervention
in the developmental narrative. Escobar identifies and labels this process, “Development has
become the grand strategy through which the transformation of the not-yet-too rational Latin
American/Third World subjectivity is to be achieved. In this way, long-standing cultural
practices and meanings – as well as the social relations in which they are embedded – are
altered.” 174 Escobar’s use of the term “strategy” is important because strategy implies there is
some level of intent. With development, the intent is to literally alter the way of life for people in
the Third World.
First and Second World interventions into the Third World were one way the
development strategy materialized. The characteristics of the people were used as justifications
for outside intervention. When the people were described as helpless, poverty stricken, disease
ridden, violent or lacking the basic needs considered necessary for survival, external institutions
started intervening. Stephen John Stedman argues that, “the international community’s obligation
to intervene wherever a state or group within a state fails to meet the humanitarian needs of its
people” had become the general principle informing interventions into the Third World. 175 While
stopping internal conflict or human suffering were identified as benevolent motivations for
interfering in the Third World, other, less seemingly neutral reasons were also cited. During the
Cold War, disorder, chaos, violence, insecurity and uncertainty within the populations of the
Third World drove interventions by both the First and Second World. Mohammed Ayoob claims
that “both superpowers were wary of states breaking apart in unpredictable ways that might either
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work to the detriment of Moscow or Washington or involve one or both of them in messy
situations from which they might be unable to extricate themselves.” 176 Critics claimed that
outside parties only intervened when their security interests were at stake or the intervention
served them politically. 177
The communities inhabiting the Third World were not merely transformed, they were
often removed from their own context toward an end goal of progress. From the perspective of
development programs and discourse, the individuals or community making up the Third World
were forced into a subject position other than their own in order to be considered eligible for
various forms of aid. Wood describes this process of removal as “a central feature of the political
disorganization of subordinated classes.” 178 Stripped and de-linked from their individual
biographies and historical narratives, the Third World people were described by their label,
“‘refugees’, itinerants’, ‘slum dwellers’, vagrants’ and so on.” 179 The people of the Third World
were not known for their individual stories but by the homogenous shared characteristics
embodied in a label.
The “refugee” label was perhaps the most prominent label used to describe the people
from the Third World. The term “refugee” was a dominant label because of its adoption by the
international community and non-governmental. Roger Zetter claims, “Within the repertoire of
humanitarian concern, refugee now constitutes one of the most powerful labels.” 180 The turbulent
and unstable history of the Third World drives the use and force of the refugee label. B. E.
Harrell-Bond and E. Voutira explains the contemporary origins of modern refugees,
The history of refugees in this century began with the replacement of the old multi-ethnic
European empires by the new world order of sovereign nation states. Hundreds of
thousands of people were forced to flee their homes because they did not ‘belong’, they
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did not fit the nationalist principle of ‘one state, one culture’ (Gellner 1983) and thus
could not be accommodated within European national state borders. 181
The rise of the nation-state imposed new and different forms of law and community. The lives
and stories prevalent within the communities were stripped away with the change in governance.
The “refugee” label was used to describe people who did not belong to the new nation-state and
no longer had the old empire to call home.
The emergence and increased awareness of Third World states amplified the popularity of
the “refugee” label. While the turn of the nineteenth century witnessed the replacement of
empires with modern nation-states, the twentieth century was characterized by the conflict,
turmoil and violence of world wars and countless regional bloodshed. In the midst of these
various hostilities were the destruction, portioning and creation of nation-states. Aristide Zolberg
argues, “Underdevelopment contributes to the generation of refugee flows in that it fosters the
adoption of authoritarian strategies of state and nation formation, whose execution entails
political persecution of certain categories of the population.” 182 The chaos associated with
colonialist struggles and an almost constant presence of war forced many people to flee. Zolberg
concludes, “refugee flows in the post-World War II period have added up to unprecedented
numbers.” 183 The “refugee” label then became largely associated with individuals, groups and
populations who had left volatile circumstances in search of security and assistance.
The broad history of refugees helps identify and yield insight into the characteristics
commonly associated with the people in the Third World. First, the appearance of refugees was
credited to the failure of government to care for its population. Emma Haddad explains, ”[T]he
fundamental criterion necessary for refugee status is a breakdown in the state-citizen relationship
within a sustaining political community.” 184 Second, the broken relationship between citizens
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and their states informed common refugee characterizations. For example, Zetter suggests
“dependency and control” are intrinsic concepts in the refugees’ relationships with government
institutions. 185 Labeling someone or a group of people as refugees, Zetter maintains, “prescribes
an assumed set of needs (food, shelter and protection) together with appropriate distributional
apparatus.” 186 The label became more institutionalized because levels of aid and assistance
depended on whether one was labeled a refugee, an internally displaced person or an asylum
seeker. Finally, the “refugee” label was not merely negative or destructive. While some refugees
cast off the connotations of dependency and neediness, other refugees embraced the label as
productive as a way to access resources or control of one’s life. Haddad explains, “[T]his identity
[refugee] may create solidarity which can be used in the refugees’ favour to apply pressure on the
labellers – governments, refugee organistations and aid workers.” 187 Individuals have demanded
the status of refugees so that their interests can be represented and received on a governmental
and international level. For many refugees, claiming the label was their only way to access
needed resources.
The history of the relationship between the Third World and the people of the Third
World enables a better understanding of the “Third World” label in the mass media coverage of
Hurricane Katrina. Though critics have attempted to change the meanings associated with the
populations of the Third World, several characteristics remain. Generally speaking, the people of
the Third World were not treated as individuals but as a homogenous population. The population
was often described as poor, underdeveloped, criminal and violent. The depth and richness of an
individual is reduced and encompassed in group labels, most commonly the label refugee. In the
following section, this study will utilize this history of the people of the Third World to analyze
the Third World clusters referring to the people of the Gulf Coast.
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The Third World as People in Katrina Coverage
The mainstream mass media referred to the people of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast in
thirty-nine of the ninety-four article sample. For purposes of discussion, I have divided the
clusters emerging from depictions of the people into four groupings: demographics, criminal,
refugee and heroic characteristics. These four sets of characterizations were both the most
prevalent and offered the richest descriptions for cluster analysis.
The first set of clusters described the people of the Gulf Coast by their demographic
characteristics. In ten different articles, the media coverage in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
reported about the poor, black people left behind in the Gulf Coast. Richard Halicks, of the
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, commented that, “The faces upturned and pleading as the
helicopters flew past were invariably black and poor and abandoned.” 188 Kevin Sullivan, writing
for The Washington Post, extended Halicks commentary into the international sphere, “From
Argentina to Zimbabwe, front-page photos of the dead and desperate in New Orleans, almost all
of them poor and black, have sickened them and shaken assumptions about American might.” 189
The reporting that included the demographic clusters drew analogies with other poor, black
cultures around the globe. Sullivan’s piece claimed the descriptions of poor, black citizens
largely forgotten and abandoned made the Gulf Coast look more “like Haiti, or Baghdad, or
Sudan, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka” than the United States. 190 The comparison of the suddenly
visible black and poor American faces in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to places outside of
the United States was not uncommon. Bill McKibben, of Newsday (New York), stated,
Over and over in the last few weeks, people have said that the scenes from the convention
center, the highway overpasses and the other suddenly infamous Crescent City venues
didn't "look like America," that they seemed instead to be straight from the Third World.
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That was almost literally accurate, for poor, black New Orleans (whose life had never
previously been of any interest to the larger public) is not so different from other poor and
black parts of the world. 191
The mostly poor, black populations abandoned in the wake of Katrina’s devastation closely
resembled the commonly assumed population of the rest of the Third World. While the public
seemingly knew that portions of the American population were poor and black, the clusters
revealed an American public shocked by the similarities between the people of the Gulf Coast
and the people in the Third World.
In the aftermath of Katrina, the media coverage additionally portrayed the people of the
Gulf Coast as criminal in ten articles. Four articles described the people as “gangs,” four articles
referenced criminal activities and two articles referred to the residents as “thugs.” The coverage
in a Times-Picayune (New Orleans) piece was representative of how the communication
constructed the people of the area as criminals and gangs. The Times-Picayune reported,
One law enforcement officer who was bringing a canister of ammo said: "The problem is,
they let those thugs get the best of them. Everyone says they want law and order, but they
don't want no one's head getting cracked." Further uptown, police and military were
generally scarce, and many residents who had decided to ride things out changed their
minds, citing the lawless climate. 192
The coverage did not report individual criminals; rather the media reported about groups of
“thugs.” There were no isolated criminals or incidents but amorphous threats of group crime and
violence. The article not only treated the people of New Orleans as “thugs” but then
distinguished between the “thugs” and the residents. The piece made it appear as if the “thugs”
were not also residents.
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The media characterized the people as Third World by referring to their thug-like
characteristics. Jerry Newton, a 54 year-old florist from New Orleans, was quoted in the Daily
News (New York), “”When the lights go out, they are not here,” Newton said.” And then the
thugs come out murdering people. It's like a Third World nation." 193 Newton explicitly
associated the emergence of thugs with the Third World. The thug characteristics were not
merely theft or looting, but also included violent crimes like murder. Leventhal, in a letter to the
editor, identified “uncontrolled gangs of thugs” with the Third World and the Gulf Coast. 194
Much of the mass media coverage treated the people of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast as
violent, chaotic and threatening.
While the media characterized the people of the Gulf Coast by their demographic makeup
and proclivity for criminal activity, the most common, controversial and memorable label used to
describe them was “refugee.” Fifteen different articles employed the “refugee” label either to
describe the people from the affected areas or to engage in the media debate surrounding the
label’s usage. Cara Buckley, of The Seattle Times, told the story of Earl Clark, a longtime
resident of New Orleans. Buckley reported,
Clark had fled New Orleans grudgingly but with little regret, so confident was he of
coming back. But like tens of thousands of fellow evacuees from the drowned city, Clark
has been forced to face a harrowing reality: He is no longer an evacuee but a refugee, and
there is no home to return to anymore. 195
In this case, “refugee” was not a blanket label. The reporter used “refugee” because of a change
in circumstances. Clark was an “evacuee” when it was believed he might return to his home in
New Orleans. Clark became a “refugee” once he realized he can never return home. In The
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Seattle Times, the word “refugee” was used to characterize an individual because they were
literally seeking refugee, they were without a home.
Within the media coverage of Katrina’s landfall on the Gulf Coast, refugees were
considered intrinsic to the Third World. Buckley and others did not think refugees could exist in
the United States. For them, refugees were a Third World characteristic. She claimed, “Experts
are used to tackling this kind of problem in war zones or Third World countries. That these
refugees are Americans even the poorest of whom are used to certain standards of living
complicates the matter enormously.” 196 Refugee was linked to the Third World through
characteristics of uncertainty, turbulence and low standards of living. The refugee characteristic
continued the juxtaposition of the Third World against America. The post-Katrina media
coverage revealed the dichotomy that refugees were supposed to belong in the Third World, but
were unfathomable in the United States.
The public reaction to the use of the “refugee” label in media coverage played an even
more dominant role than the use of the label itself. Analyzing the media exchange over the
“refugee” label will explicate the different ways the people were labeled throughout the postKatrina coverage. Eleven different articles spoke directly to the question of using the “refugee”
label to report on the people of the Gulf Coast. In addition to the number of articles, the
magnitude of expressed outrage was high. Frederick L. Daniels Jr., a senior vice president for
Citizens Trust Bank, was quoted in The Atlanta Journal-Constitution claiming that the use of the
refugee label was “a direct insult to the people who have suffered through the worst disaster in
this nation's history.” 197 Daniels followed up his objection with a question: “Is it the fact that
most of those evacuated from New Orleans and the Gulf region are people of color who are poor,
disfranchised and represent a Third World country quality of life that contributes to the flippant
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attitude regarding the use of ‘refugee’?... A better word would be ‘evacuee.’” 198 Implicit in
Daniels’ sentiment was the presumption that America was different from and above the Third
World. Ernie Suggs, a reporter for The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, made the relationship
explicit when he asked, “People had been traumatized enough; why traumatize them further?” 199
Suggs rhetorical question spoke to the intensity surrounding the media coverage’s use of the
“refugee” label in reporting about the people of the Gulf Coast. The vocal public covered in postKatrina media outlets were outraged that people who had already suffered one of the worst
hurricanes in United States history were also being tormented through the use of the negative
label. Most of the editorial reporting concluded with Daniels and Suggs that the media should not
have used the “refugee” label because of its associated characteristics. Instead, a label like
“evacuee” was more appropriate.
The “refugee” label’s association with the Third World was a key reason the label became
controversial. Dick Rogers, of The San Francisco Chronicle, reported on the dispute,
While a refugee simply may be someone seeking refuge from disaster, it also is frequently
associated with someone who flees a Third World country to find safety and comfort
elsewhere. That gives rise to the argument that calling the hurricane's victims refugees is
dismissive, suggesting that they're somehow less American, less worthy than the rest of
us. 200
According to the argument’s logic, the “refugee” label was incorrect because the individuals
affected were citizens of the United States, not individuals without a nation-state. Citizens are
not treated like refugees. Refugees, according to Daniels’ characterizations, were poor people of
color with lower standards of living and no governmental support to help in a time of need.
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Citizens, however, were supposed to have a responsive state government looking out for their
best interest, security and livelihood.
Critics also claimed the controversy over the “refugee” label reflected more about the
American perspective than on the label itself. Nancy Barnes, who wrote a letter to the editor in
the Buffalo News (New York), commented,
They seem to think the word "reduces" Americans to Third World status. Such a
consideration betrays an elitism that is insulting to those who live in developing
countries. To set the record straight, the word doesn't define who a person is, but rather a
set of circumstances in which one is caught. 201
Barnes referred to leaders of the African-American community who believed the “refugee” label
was employed because the people surviving Hurricane Katrina were mostly poor and black.
Barnes’ response refuted the notion that refugees or the Third World were intrinsically less than
American citizens. She claimed the massive public outcry was indicative of an American
exceptionalism that believed Americans should not be treated without food, shelter or
government protection. Lavinia Limon, President and Chief Executive of the U.S. Committee for
Refugees and Immigrants, offered a unique perspective on the “refugee” label question. While
understanding that individuals may refuse the “refugee” label, Limon argued that, “Being a
refugee should not be a pejorative term.” 202 The public debate over the mass media use of the
“refugee” label raised important questions about the characteristics associated with the label and
the assumptions involved in employing or repudiating the refugee label.
The mass media coverage of local resilience and character demonstrated that the
representations of the people of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast were not entirely negative; the
broadcasts reported many of the more positive associations attributed to the people. Twelve
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different articles referenced some anecdote about a neighbor or stranger helping out a person in
need. Eliot Kamenitz, of New Orleans, reported the local generosity and spirit in the TimesPicayune (New Orleans),
It's a lousy place to build a city. It just happens to be populated by some very hearty
people, who are only going to get better as they demand more of themselves. This is why
I have to stay. This is my community. I am staying because that's where the New
Orleanians will be. 203
In stark contrast to describing the people of New Orleans as dirty, corrupt or refugees, Kamenitz
explained his decision to stay in terms of the people’s character. Wonderful, kindness and
beautiful were how others described the character and actions of the people of New Orleans and
the Gulf Coast. 204 Kamenitz stayed because of the community that had developed in and around
New Orleans. Jeannette Russell and Lorraine Quillen, sisters and residents of New Orleans, told
the story of Quillen’s nephew Johnnie Parker to exemplify New Orleans’ local heroes. 205
Parker’s heroism was attributed to his evacuation assistance and diligence aiding those affected
by Katrina. Despite the seemingly negatively veiled economic, political and demographic
descriptions of the displaced peoples, media outlets reported heroic characteristics about the local
culture.
The clustered associations used to describe the people of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast
provide a means of better understanding the use of the “Third World” label in the media
coverage of Hurricane Katrina. The people were described in what was reported as largely
negative terms: poor, black, gangs and refugees. The people affected by Katrina and the public
critics decried the media labeling as treating the individuals as inferior and further traumatizing
their well-being. The media coverage and public pushback, however, was not entirely negative.
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While in the minority, some media outlets and individuals reported the positive experiences and
characteristics that the displaced people encountered and embodied after Katrina’s aftermath. The
following section will conclude this chapter by analyzing the possible motivations for employing
the “Third World” label to describe the people of the Gulf Coast.
Third World Motivations: Labeling a Third World People
Burke’s agent-act ratio describes how and why the Third World characteristics are
associated with the people of the Gulf Coast in the mass media coverage following Hurricane
Katrina. In describing the function of the ratio, Burke writes,
The agent does not “contain” the act, though its results might be said to “pre-exist
virtually” within him. And the act does not “synecdochically share” in the agent, though
certain ways of acting may be said to induce corresponding moods or traits of
character...the act-agent ratio more strongly suggests a temporal or sequential relationship
than a purely positional or geometric one. The agent is an author of his acts, which are
descended from him, being good progeny if he is good, or bad progeny if he is bad...his
acts can make him or remake him in accordance with their nature. They would be his
product and/or he would be theirs. 206
Throughout the media coverage of the people, the agents and their acts were dominant. The
agents were the people defined by their homogenized demographics or characteristics. The acts
were characterized as criminal, violent and disorderly on the one hand and heroic on the other
hand.
The agent-act ratio is able to account for the different and even seemingly contradictory
agents and acts described in the media coverage. For Burke, rhetors may reference multiple
agents associated with a cluster of acts. For example, Burke argues bad acts come from bad
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agents whereas good acts descend from good agents. In the Hurricane Katrina coverage, the
people were largely described homogenously according to their demographics and the “refugee”
label. These poor, black refugees were described as producing acts that were criminal and violent
in nature. By contrast, a few individuals were not treated universally within the population but
were separated out as individuals. In these cases, the media did not obscure the individual from
his or her respective story. The individual story was distinct from the acts clustered around the
homogenous group. In opposition to the group’s disorderly acts, the individual acts described a
hearty culture that included a number of wonderful and kind people. Even though the agents and
corresponding acts may appear contradictory, the media presence of both positive and negative
agents and acts is explained by the division between good and bad agents.
Analyzing the agent-act ratio also provides possible motivations for the media use of the
“Third World” label to describe the people of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast in the coverage of
Hurricane Katrina. Separating, or keeping separate, the people of the United States from the
Third World was one potential motivating force for identifying the people of the Gulf Coast with
Third World characteristics. The shock and outrage expressed by the public in the clusters
demonstrated that the unseemly reports of poor, black people either stranded helpless or
participating in criminal activity did not fit within the public image one typically has of American
citizens. The media coverage might have labeled the people of the Gulf Coast as Third World to
ensure they remained at a distance from the First World America. The acts are tied or linked back
to the agent. If Americans were to be linked to acts typically characteristic of the Third World,
the legitimacy of America’s First World status would be in question. The history of refugees
magnified this motivation. The characteristics associated with refugees were evoked by failed
states, human suffering violence, and a broken relationship between the government and its
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people. The people identified and the acts committed on the Gulf Coast had to be separated from
the people of the United States to preserve the identity and order of an American First World.
A second possible reason for labeling the people of the Gulf Coast with Third World
associations is to prefigure or shape the responses to Katrina’s aftermath. On the one hand,
labeling the effected people similar to people of the Third World can invoke feelings of sympathy
and calls for assistance from the First World. For example, the “refugee” label calls forth the
imagery and history of development aid. People needing shelter, food and security are taken care
of by government institutions, non-government organizations and the general public. The stories
about individuals providing help along the Gulf Coast and throughout the United States
demonstrate a productive function of using the Third World characteristics to describe the
people. The actual stories of the individuals might have been employed to provoke identification
with the effected peoples.
On the other hand, the very same Third World descriptions can be used to deny assistance
or aid to the people of the Gulf Coast. The refugee literature and debate in the media coverage
suggested that governments delay or deny assistance based on refugee status. While denial or
delay may seem like hostile actions, they are often justified because of seemingly innocent
concerns about resources, politics and jurisdiction.
The media use of individualized stories and homogenous labels provides a third potential
motivating force for the Third World depictions. In contrast to the individual stories, the
descriptions used to distance and denigrate the people of the Gulf Coast were homogenous
characterizations stripped of their individuality. The particular people of the Gulf Coast were
transformed into refugees, thugs and armed gangs. The very same descriptions were used
throughout the Third World history to justify interventions by outside actors. The American
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public would not accept armed soldiers and tanks patrolling New Orleans if the survivors were
merely American individuals who needed assistance. The people had to be transformed into a
Third World population with their subsequent violent and criminal acts to defend the military
involvement. Military involvement was necessary to secure the people and stop the Third World
acts from threatening the First World American people and their ordered way of life.
Finally, the debate about what to label the people affected by Hurricane Katrina reveals
motivations grounded in returning humanity to the Gulf Coast and the public’s desire for guilt
relief. Throughout the media coverage that discussed the use of the “refugee” label, the recurrent
criticism was that the label did an injustice to the people displaced by Katrina. The label did not
treat the people of the Gulf Coast as Americans, citizens or people of the First World. The
“refugee” label was blamed for doing more damage to an already traumatized population.
Burke’s understanding of scapegoating and mortification helps explain the public’s refusal of the
refugee label. Burke suggests “[I]t [the scapegoat] performs the role of vicarious atonement (that
is, unification, or merger, granted to those who have alienated their iniquities upon it, and so may
be purified through its suffering).” 207 The scapegoat bears the burden of whatever guilt,
characteristics or problems that have been thrust upon the goat by the guilt-ridden party. One is
able to feel as though their guilt has been assuaged by externalizing the guilt onto the scapegoat
and subsequently blaming, sacrificing or eliminating the scapegoat.
In the context of Hurricane Katrina, the “refugee” label, with its associated qualities and
Third World roots, became a scapegoat to absolve the public’s guilt for the historical
mistreatment of the people of the Gulf Coast and public’s inability to do little, if anything toward
improving the material conditions of those most affected by Katrina. Barry Brummett identifies
two important requirements of a scapegoat. He argues, “First, it must be anecdotal, i.e., it must be
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representative of ‘certain unwanted evils,’ the guilt felt by those who make of the representative a
scapegoat.” 208 The “refugee” label was representative because the label embodied the
characteristics associated with the United States failure to care for its people, both in the
reference to America’s history of racism and the more immediate failure to anticipate and act on
Hurricane Katrina’s devastation of the Gulf Coast. Brummett’s second requirement is that the
goat must be powerful. He claims, “Its power must be at least equal to the burden of guilt so that
the sacrifice of the goat destroys a vessel strong enough to hold the transgressions.” 209
Scapegoating the “refugee” label is powerful because the label can be eliminated. In fact, many
newsrooms across the country stopped using the “refugee” label after a tremendous amount of
public outcry. If the refugees themselves had been the object of scapegoating, the absolution
would not have been nearly as successful. Individuals across the country expressed outrage over
the refugee label because in a sense, the language choices used to describe the people of the
Third World were the only situations they could change.
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CHAPTER 5.
CONCLUSIONS
It must be recongised that there is a basic tension in the idea of a Third World. It [the Third
World] can be understood as a response to global inequality but it is also a symptom of First
World thinking, a category imposed as part of a specific First World way of seeing things.
Vicky Randall 210
This study has been concerned with different ways that the “Third World” label has been
employed throughout the mass media coverage of Hurricane Katrina. As Randall’s proposed
tension suggests, the “Third World” label has historically been both productive and destructive.
Individuals and populations have invoked the “Third World” label and its attendant imagery for
the purposes of empathy, resistance, assistance and solidarity. The very same label has been used
to subjugate, dominate and denigrate groups, government institutions, places and whole
populations. I have analyzed questions of how and why the “Third World” label was used in
describing Katrina’s landfall and subsequent aftermath. In doing so, this study has demonstrated
the importance of incorporating a communication or more specifically a rhetorical perspective for
better understanding the how and why the “Third World” label was used to describe the United
States, typically thought of as the First World.
In this final chapter, I offer more general conclusions and reflections about the
implications of this cluster analysis of the “Third World” label throughout the mainstream mass
media coverage of Hurricane Katrina. First, I articulate what the study established about the
importance of a communication perspective for better understanding Hurricane Katrina’s
landfall. Second, I describe what contributions this study might make toward the field of rhetoric.
Finally, I identify the limitations of this study and gesture towards possibilities for future
research.
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Communication and Hurricane Katrina
Previous scholarly literature that discussed the events leading up to, during and after
Katrina’s landfall rarely, if ever, took into account the way we communicated about the event.
When communication was mentioned, it was generally understood in the context of whether or
not the proper crisis information was communicated or if the infrastructure for communication
was in place. This study revealed other important questions a rhetorical perspective can identify
and explore to better understand the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Utilizing the cluster
analysis of the “Third World” label in the media coverage, I argued that rhetorical analysis
provided insight into questions of identity, identification, media influence, community,
government action/inaction and tensions in language and media coverage taking place throughout
the events leading up to, during and following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall.
The use of the “Third World” label to describe a seemingly First World country was a
major theme throughout this study. The meaning of the “Third World” label was contradictory at
moments but remained largely associated with negative characteristics. The history of the “Third
World” label proved the label’s use during the media coverage of places, institutions and people
following Hurricane Katrina was not an aberration. The label was affiliated with paternalism,
racism and a civilizing force. The label’s historic use for describing recurred in the coverage. The
label was not only employed to categorize and order people, places and government, but was also
occasionally used to resist the very same forces. The “Third World” label helped motivate the
public to accept decisions to intervene into a situation, but also kept particular parties motivated
against intervention. The cluster analysis, as an example of a rhetorical perspective, emerged as a
means for identifying and analyzing potential tensions within the media coverage of Hurricane
Katrina.
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Extended beyond mere location of moments of tension, cluster analysis demonstrated
how rhetoric can navigate and comprehend seeming contradictions. The analysis of the
paradoxical Third World place in a traditionally held First World place revealed one such
strategy. I relied on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s disassociation and appearance-reality
pairing to make sense of the tensions and contradictions. When one concept or perspective is in
disagreement with another, a tension arises. In the context of Katrina, a tension existed because a
place being simultaneously labeled First World and Third World, where the Third World history
demonstrated those concepts to be largely incompatible. The appearance-reality dyad provided a
way to better understand the tension and the overall media coverage of Katrina. I argued that
within the reports that described the place of the Gulf Coast as the Third World, the First World
was used to characterize the appearance whereas the Third World characteristics were the reality.
Disassociating appearance from reality also provides a perspective for analyzing the
tensions that appeared in the media coverage. In chapter three, I discussed how the “Third
World” label was employed as a tool to critique the local, state and federal government’s
response to Katrina. This understanding created a tension because First World and Third World
characterizations seemed to reside in the same government institution. Employing Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, I concluded that one can differentiate between the appearance of acting like a
Third World government and the reality of being a First World government. The motivation was
that while the governments were indeed First World governments, they were behaving like Third
World governments. By utilizing the appearance-reality dyad, I argued that the media encouraged
the government to move beyond the appearance of a First World country to the reality of one.
In chapter four, I identified tensions in how the people of the Gulf Coast were reported in
the media coverage. On the one hand, the survivors were described as a homogenous group, often
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labeled refugees, who had committed largely negative Third World acts. On the other hand, the
survivors were also presented as individuals, with storied details, who had carried out positive,
heroic acts. The appearance-reality distinction also helps explain this tension. The reality was
that all of the people within the media coverage of Katrina had individual characteristics and
stories, most of which were not reported. The appearance was of a homogenous group stripped of
details and individuality. The motives for this distinction were discussed in the chapter but the
disassociation made the motivations behind the coverage clearer. The appearance of a
homogenized group was useful for justifying the military and humanitarian intervention. The
appeal to individual stories of heroic acts was utilized for invoking identification and prompting
assistance from other generous individuals. While the individual chapters yield insight into the
various motivations that emerged across particular clusters, Burke’s ratios provide a vehicle for
understanding the primary message conveyed in the coverage.
Recall that the Third World as place was interpreted as an example of the scene-act ratio,
the government institutions as Third World was described as the agent-agency ratio and the
Katrina survivors as people of the Third World was explained as the agent-act ratio. While the
different elements of the pentad are always in relation to one another, it was clear that the scene
played the dominant role throughout this sample of media coverage. Scene-act was the dominant
ratio in eighty-three articles while agent-agency was represented forty-seven times and agent-act
in forty-four instances. This study also revealed that the differing ratios throughout the media
coverage took place largely at the level of appearances while scene was the reality. Remember
that in chapter two, this study argued that the appearance of the scene dominated in the preKatrina coverage of the Gulf Coast while the reality of the scene governed the post-Katrina
media reporting. Even though the agents were the dominating term, in chapters three and four,
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motivating the descriptions of the government institutions and people of the Gulf Coast as Third
World, the reality was the scene played an even more significant factor motivating the use of the
“Third World” label. The scene was dominant because the blame and responsibility could be
taken away from the agents, government or individual, and placed on the change in scene. If the
agents were the dominant term throughout the coverage, the people of New Orleans, the Gulf
Coast, government and society at large would be accountable for the devastation wrought by
Hurricane Katrina. Privileging the scene enabled the public to think that one only needed to
change the scene to pre-Katrina appearances to remove the Third World agents, acts and
agencies. This study concludes that the media reported and relied on Third World scenic
descriptions to call for and prepare the public for eventual changes in the scene.
The significant influence that labels had on justifying preferred response options was a
final way this study demonstrated a better understanding of Hurricane Katrina through rhetorical
analysis. For example, one of the discussions taking place after Katrina centered on why the
military, exemplified by tanks and armed soldiers, played a dominant role in assisting the Gulf
Coast. 211 While Graham and Giroux provided explanations like the “War on Terror” or
biopolitics, neither could demonstrate how either the military was mobilized or the people
allowed such militarization to occur. Cluster analysis, an example of rhetorical analysis, was able
to explain what other critics could not. This study established the “Third World” label as a way
the Gulf Coast area could be transformed from a First World city to a Third World place. The
repeated use of the “Third World” label was able to alter expectations about disaster response
and set in motion certain interventionist practices that are deemed normal for the Third World
but seemed out of place in First World America.
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Contributions to Rhetorical Theory and Criticism
The cluster analysis of the “Third World” label in the media coverage of Hurricane
Katrina revealed three possible contributions to the discipline of rhetorical theory and criticism.
First, this study’s reading of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work on the appearance-reality
pairing as an argumentative strategy of disassociation to interpret the scene extends the power of
Burke’s pentadic analysis. In chapter two, this study argued that the Gulf Coast as a Third World
place was not a stable, unified scene. On the contrary, the Gulf Coast was characterized almost as
if it was constituted by multiple, overlapping scenes. Specifically, a First World scene and a
Third World scene. The media coverage not only reported these two scenes but also indicated
that the relationship changed when Hurricane Katrina struck the United States. Before Katrina,
the appearance of the First World dominated the reality of the Third World. After Katrina, the
reality of the Third World dominated the First World appearance. Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca’s disassociation and appearance-reality dyad helped explain the varying, interacting
scenes because they were motivated and acted on by a fundamental distinction between
appearance and reality. Reading multiple scenes, apparently contradicting yet still networked
together, might contribute to better analysis of studies where one coherent scene cannot be
explained or justified.
Second, this study provides an example of extending Burke’s cluster analysis to multiple
and sometimes incomplete authors and/or texts. Burke’s own examples of cluster or pentadic
analysis tend to be from one author’s speech or text and much of the rhetorical field has followed
this tradition. This cluster analysis follows in the footsteps of Heinz and Lee, who also drew from
a large sample of multiple authors across the government, meat industry and public. Along with
Heinz and Lee, this study has argued that cluster analysis of multiple authors and texts can begin
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to access not just the motives of single authors but larger possible social-symbolic motives for
employing certain clusters and their associated relationships. By seeing which ratio dominates an
entire sample of media coverage, the motivations by an increasing media conglomerate might be
revealed.
Third, this study supplements current approaches to Burkean cluster analysis by
experimenting with the different pentadic ratios. Based on the earlier review of rhetorical studies
that employed cluster analysis, I would suggest that most perform cluster analysis from within a
single dominant pentadic term. By that, I mean that the critic selects one term as the root and
either interprets the text exclusively from one ratio, like scene-act, or from multiple ratios all
rooted in the same term, like scene-act, scene-agent, scene-agency, scene-purpose. To be clear,
this style of cluster analysis rooted in a single root term has and continues to offer insightful and
provocative criticism. The study operated slightly different. Instead of identifying one root ratio, I
identified three different root ratios to interpret and analyze the texts. By experimenting with the
different pentad terms and possible ratio relationships, I was able to explore an already
complicated field of public discourse, argumentation and motivations. Even though I concluded
that scene was the dominant term and motivating force for the use of the “Third World” label
throughout media coverage of Hurricane Katrina, offering different ratio interpretations
improved the analysis and provided a better understanding of scene, the “Third World” label and
the media coverage of Katrina.
Limitations and Future Research
There are several identifiable limitations to this study’s approach to analyzing mainstream
mass media use of the “Third World” label in media coverage of Hurricane Katrina. First, this
study focused only on major media newspapers and did not evaluate smaller markets. While this
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sample choice may have ensured the overall sentiments expressed were included, any deviations
or different motivations based on demographic or population size would not have been included
in this study. Second, the sample did not include any video or audio. While the sample did
include transcripts from the larger media television or radio programs that met the market size
limitations, I did not analyze any other media. This poses a potentially serious limitation because
video and still pictures were what stirred up much of the discussion following Katrina. A third
limitation regarding the sample was the selected timeframe. While the limits chosen did allow for
a depth and richness to the cluster samples, almost five years have passed since the New Year
following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. This analysis could only improve by including the
coverage and Katrina related articles in the years passed. Finally, this study only chose one
method, cluster analysis, to represent a rhetorical perspective on Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. A
lot of the great work that has done over the last several thousand years is being left out by
selecting only one method. Alternate methods would offer other productive insights into better
understanding the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina.
Taking into account some of the limitations from this study, I do have several
recommendations for future research. I am inclined to suggest that other critics interested in
pursuing this line of inquiry find some way to include video and images into their study. Second,
I would suggest employing a different method to approach the media coverage of Hurricane
Katrina. I do not necessarily think another method would be better, only that it would offer
different insight. For example, if one were to use ethnography or some version of fantasy
analysis, a critic might be better situated to access the motives for employing the “Third World”
label. Or those very same methods might take a critic away from media coverage all together.
Third, future studies of the events surrounding Katrina’s landfall would be well off to focus more
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on the history of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. While this study did attempt a brief
understanding of the history of the area and the larger South, the history is rich and deep, beyond
the scope of this study. Finally, the government response to Hurricane Katrina would make for a
great object of study. A critic could look at the documents before Katrina, detailing any warning
or preparation for a hurricane hitting the Gulf Coast. The comments made or not make by then
President Bush and his administration would provide a great opportunity for further textual
exploration. And last but not least, a bipartisan committee investigated and prepared a study
entitled “A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina” that would provide unique
insight into the governmental response to Hurricane Katrina. 212
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